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Abstract 
 
 This paper surveys the state of fiscal federalism in India, in the broader context of 
decentralization. We begin with an overview of the basic features and recent 
developments in intergovernmental fiscal relations, including the role of political 
institutions, the specifics of legislative and budgetary autonomy, assignments of 
expenditure responsibility and revenue authority, revenue collection mechanisms, the 
system of intergovernmental transfers, and institutions and mechanisms for borrowing 
by subnational units. We then provide a diagnosis of accountability mechanisms, 
examining their quality of functioning and distortions and constraints. In particular, 
we analyze to what extent, and through what mechanisms, lower-level governments 
are held accountable to higher-level governments, the extent to which policies of 
subnational governments are affected by the competition for mobile firms, taxpayers, 
and investment capital, the functioning of credit markets, including the 
responsiveness of subnational governments to credit ratings and bond yields, and the 
role of democratic electoral channels at national and subnational levels in providing 
accountability in the provision of subnational public goods. Next, we review the 
implications of the intergovernmental system and accountability mechanisms on the 
cooperation of subnational governments and the quality of service delivery. We 
examine the resources and capacity of the subnational entities that are responsible for 
key services such as water, sanitation, education and health care, and the impacts of 
decentralization on service quality and the distribution of benefits among elected 
officials, citizens and interest groups. Finally, we offer a concluding assessment with 
suggestions for reform priorities. 
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1. Overview of Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations  
India is a large, heterogeneous and complex nation, with multiple languages, 
religions and ethnicities, and over one billion people. In some respects, it stands out in its 
political structures, having sustained a working democracy for over five decades at 
relatively low levels of income. It also is distinguished by its institutional richness and 
the relative stability of these institutions (Kapur, 2005). Intergovernmental fiscal relations 
in India must be understood in the context of this broader perspective. 
 
 
1.1. Political institutions  
India became an independent democratic nation in August 1947 and a 
constitutional republic in January 1950. The constitution explicitly incorporated a federal 
structure, with states as subnational entities that were assigned specified political and 
fiscal authorities. However, these states were not treated as independent sovereigns 
voluntarily joining a federation. Thus, for example, the princely states that existed at the 
time of independence, under the umbrella of British rule, were rapidly absorbed and 
consolidated into the new political structure, with their special status greatly attenuated, 
and ultimately (by 1970) totally removed. Also, the states’ boundaries were not inviolate, 
but have been repeatedly redrawn by unilateral central action, as allowed by the 
constitution. India is now comprised of 28 states, six “Union Territories” (UTs) and a 
National Capital Territory (NCT), Delhi. In general, the constitution was structured to 
give the central government residual authority and considerable sovereign discretion over 
the states, creating a relatively centralized federation. 
 
The primary expression of statutory constitutional authority in India comes 
through directly elected parliamentary-style governments at the national and state levels, 
as well as nascent directly elected government bodies at various local levels. The national 
parliament has two chambers, one (the Lok Sabha or peoples’ assembly) directly elected 
in single member, first-past-the post constituencies, the other (the Rajya Sabha, or states’ 
council) indirectly elected by state legislators. The Prime Minister and council of 
ministers serve as the executive branch, rather than the largely ceremonial President of 
the republic. The states, plus the NCT and the UT of Pondicherry, mostly have single-
chamber, directly-elected legislatures, with Chief Ministers in the executive role.1 The 
other UTs are governed directly by appointees of the central government. Each state also 
has a Governor, nominally appointed by the President, but effectively an agent of the 
Prime Minister. Overlapping political authorities at the central and state levels have been 
dealt with through intra-party bargaining, and, more recently, through explicit bargaining 
and discussion. The Inter-State Council (ISC) was created in 1990, and has become a 
forum where some political and economic issues of joint concern can be collectively 
discussed and possibly resolved.2  
                                                 
1 Initially, all the states had bicameral legislatures, with indirectly elected Legislative Councils (LCs) in 
addition to Legislative Assemblies but over time, most chose to abolish the former. Currently, five states 
(Bihar, Jammu and Kashmir, Karnataka, Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh) still have LCs. 
2 The ISC includes the Prime Minister, state Chief Ministers, and several central cabinet ministers as 
members. While the ISC is merely advisory, it has formalized collective discussion and approval of several 
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Concentration of powers in the hands of the central government did not create 
serious conflicts in the early years of the functioning of the constitution since the same 
political party, the Indian National Congress (INC), ruled at the center and in the states.  
Many potential interstate or center-state conflicts were resolved within the party.  The 
INC was essentially an umbrella organization that had pursued a campaign of 
independence from colonial rule, and this nationalist history contributed to its initial near-
monopoly of political power. Over time, the nationalist coalition eroded, with opposition 
emerging on both sides of the political spectrum. When the INC began to lose power in 
some states, political and constitutional conflicts became more open.  The states, which 
are, by history and by construction, relatively linguistically and culturally homogeneous 
did exert pressure in some cases (for example in redrawing state boundaries).3 Periodic 
attempts at reexamining center-state relations through various commissions did lead to 
some innovations (e.g., the creation of the ISC), but not to any fundamental constitutional 
changes in the federal balance. However, there was a somewhat natural rise of regional 
parties in the states, a process that began relatively early in India’s post-independence 
history, but accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s. These regional parties, in addition to 
dominating subnational politics in several states, have also come to hold the balance of 
power in coalitions at the national level. Economic reforms that began in the same 
decades paralleled and accentuated this process of political decentralization. 
 
India’s relative political centralization was also reflected in bureaucratic and 
judicial institutions. The national Indian bureaucracy is provided constitutional 
recognition. There are also provisions for independent bureaucracies in each state. 
However, the key component of the bureaucracy is the Indian Administrative Service 
(IAS), whose members are chosen by a centralized process and trained together. They are 
initially assigned to particular states, and may serve varying proportions of their careers 
at the state and national levels. There are varying views on the effectiveness of the 
bureaucracy, with increasing concerns about competence and corruption leading to active 
consideration of civil service reform. However, bureaucratic functioning in India is 
relatively transparent and rule-bound, though the traditional economic policy approach 
vested the bureaucracy with considerable discretion in such matters.4
 
The judiciary is a constitutionally distinct branch of government at both national 
and state levels, though the legislative/executive branch exerts influence through 
appointments and budget allocations.  At the local level, IAS members are vested with 
some judicial authority. The Supreme Court, at the top of the judicial hierarchy, has 
powers that include broad original and appellate jurisdiction and the right to rule on the 
constitutionality of laws passed by Parliament. There has been conflict between the 
Supreme Court and the legislature/executive over the scope of these powers, but in 
specific issues of center-state relations concerning taxation and property rights, the basic 
                                                                                                                                                 
important matters impinging on India’s federal arrangements, including tax sharing and inter-state water 
disputes. 
3 Regional groupings also have led to several UTs on the periphery of the country becoming full-fledged 
states, and to the recent splitting of three large states. 
4 See Singh (2004) for a review of some of these issues. 
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centralizing features of the constitution tilted the Court’s interpretation towards the 
center. In the 1990s, it did make decisions checking the center’s ability to override 
subnational political authority by means such as dismissing state legislatures. Recently, 
the Court has also tended to engage in some forms of judicial activism in enforcing laws, 
even at the local level. At the state level, below the Supreme Court, the High Courts 
superintend the work of all courts within the state, including district and other 
subordinate courts. 
 
 
Box 1: Institutions of Local Government 
 
There are three tiers of rural local government, village group, block and district. Various names 
are used for these levels in different states, and there is also variation in size and scope.  The population per 
village group is only about 3,000. Populations per block council are considerably larger, with an average of 
just over 100,000.  The block level approximates the constituencies of the state legislatures. Populations per 
district council, the highest rural level, are about 1.5 million.  The district is approximately the size of the 
constituency of the member of the Lok Sabha.  The have been important components of the administrative 
apparatus, even prior to independence.  Considerable administrative control at the block and district levels 
has rested with IAS officials. These two levels have also been important in conceptualizing the 
implementation of India’s central plans, and strengthening block-level implementation was a significant 
part of past attempts to decentralize the planning process.  
Urban government types range from corporations to municipalities, and then town and notified 
area committees. Corporations have more autonomy and wider responsibilities than municipalities, with 
town and notified area committees being most restricted. Before the constitutional amendments, a 
difference between notified or town area committees on the one hand, and municipalities and corporations 
on the other, was that the former had no elected governing bodies: committees were appointed by state 
governments.  Since elected municipalities and corporations were often superseded or overawed by 
municipal commissioners (typically IAS members), the distinction was less important in practice.   
Under the new laws, direct elections to all local governments must be held every five years. 
Elections to constitute new bodies must be completed before the term expires.  If a local government is 
dissolved prematurely, elections must be compulsorily held within six months, the new body to serve out 
the remainder of the five-year term. Various aspects of the elections are also specified.  
Chairpersons at the intermediate and district rural levels are to be elected by the village council 
membership, while either direct or indirect elections of chairpersons are permitted at the village level.  
State level election commissions were created to supervise and manage the electoral processes.  At the 
intermediate and district levels, chairpersons of bodies one level below can be made members, as can MPs 
(Members of Parliament), MLAs (Members of Legislative Assemblies) and MLCs (Members of Legislative 
Councils). While the legislation did not conceive of the three levels as hierarchical, these features made 
hierarchy typical. There is one additional avenue of representation and accountability of local government.  
Each village group has a gram sabha, a body comprising all registered voters in the area. Gram sabha 
meetings act as village assemblies, to vote on local matters put to them, hence providing some degree of 
direct democracy if such meetings are called and used effectively.  
Within larger urban governments, wards and zones, with their own committees, are new tiers.  
Members at the ward and municipal level are now chosen by direct elections.  Zonal committees are 
composed of chairpersons of the ward committees in each zone. 
 
A potentially major change in political institutions was initiated in 1993 when, 
after decades of debate on decentralization, two constitutional amendments (the 73rd and 
74th) gave firmer legal recognition, enhanced political status, and potentially greater 
expenditure responsibilities to urban and rural local governments. The amendments 
reduced state governments’ discretionary control over elections to rural local government 
bodies.  Direct elections to local bodies must now be held every five years, potentially 
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replacing “hierarchy” with “voice” (Hirschman, 1970; Bird, Litvack and Seddon, 1999; 
Rao and Singh, 2003) as a primary accountability mechanism. Box 1 describes the 
electoral institutions of local government in more detail. Local government reform also 
changed the nature of tax and expenditure assignments to local governments by 
specifying their authority and responsibilities more fully, and it instituted a system of 
formal state-local transfers modeled on one component of the existing center-state 
system.5  
 
The impetus for strengthening local governments was quite different from that 
which led to national economic reform, but it happened to coincide with the latter 
process.  There were normative goals of promoting greater citizen involvement through 
decentralization, political considerations at the national level of balancing the power of 
states that were exerting greater autonomy, and, increasingly salient over time, hopes for 
improving the quality and effectiveness of public spending by pushing decision-making 
on local public goods down to the local level. There are serious problems with the new 
legislation and its implementation, including lack of clarity, mismatch between revenue 
and expenditure authority, problems of local capacity, poor implementation, and so on. 
Understanding and solving these problems of subnational decentralization will be critical 
to improving governance and public service delivery in India. The temporal coincidence 
of subnational decentralization with national economic reform has created additional 
challenges, because of the fiscal stress of the states since the 1990s, but also an 
opportunity for a unified approach to decentralization from center to states to local 
governments as one avenue for improving government performance.  
 
 
1.2. Legislative and budgetary autonomy  
At inception, the Indian constitution clearly laid out the areas of responsibility of 
the central and state governments, with respect to expenditure authority, revenue raising 
instruments, and legislation needed to implement either. Expenditure responsibilities are 
specified in separate Union and State Lists, with a Concurrent List covering areas of joint 
authority.6 Tax powers of these two levels of government are specified in various 
individual articles. Legislative procedures for each level, particularly with respect to 
budgets and appropriations, are spelled out in detail in the constitution, and are similar to 
parliamentary democracies elsewhere, having followed the British model.  
 
Powers of legislation for the center and states follow the responsibilities assigned 
in the three constitutional lists, but there are several relatively broad “escape clauses” 
which give the national parliament the ability to override the states’ authority in special 
circumstances. Furthermore, the assignment of legislative powers ignores potential 
conflicts, such as when international treaties, the signing of which is a central power, 
affect state subjects.7 When conflicts over legislation arise between the center and the 
                                                 
5 See Section 1.5 for a discussion of intergovernmental transfers. 
6 All residual areas not explicitly mentioned are under the center’s authority, adding another centralizing 
feature to the constitution. 
7 Kapur and Mehta (2006, p. 29) give the example of international trade agreements on agriculture, which 
is itself in the State List, while international affairs are in the Union list. 
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states, the Supreme Court is the arbiter, as mentioned in Section 1.1. The framework of 
the constitution tends to favor central authority in such cases. The power to amend the 
constitution also resides with the national parliament, with a weak requirement that half 
or more of the states ratify the amendment for it to take effect. 
 
In general, a consensus view is that the functioning of the national and state level 
legislatures has been short of reasonable standards, often resulting in poorly framed laws. 
The situation is almost certainly worse at the state than at the national level, though in 
practice, states have often followed central models for legislation on a range of issues. 
Also, the executive at each level has played a dominant role in proposing and framing 
legislation, often with limited input from the legislators themselves. 
 
The situation with respect to local governments is somewhat distinct from the 
center-state division of powers. The 1993 amendments which gave a constitutional 
imprimatur to local governments also had to leave many legislative details to the states, 
since local government was, and remained in, the State List. Furthermore most local 
responsibilities are subsets of those in the State List. There is no “Local List” as such, but 
the constitution now includes separate lists of responsibilities and powers of rural and 
urban local governments.8 The lists of local expenditure areas, though now broader and 
more explicit than was typical of past practice, still overlap considerably with the State 
List, so most local responsibilities are, in practice, concurrent responsibilities.  
 
Given the constitutional structure (the disturbance of which would have been 
effectively vetoed by the states), assignment of tax powers and details of expenditure 
assignments had to be left to state-level legislation. There has been considerable variation 
in the nature of the laws passed by the states, though it is fair to state that in general they 
have provided very little revenue autonomy to local governments, especially rural bodies. 
Paralleling this constraint, local governments also have little legislative autonomy. This is 
particularly true for rural governments, though traditional village level committees 
(panchayats) have a history of acting as quasi-legal arbiters and enforcers through social 
norms. City governments, of course, do have a well-established tradition of local 
ordinances. The point is that neither revenue authority nor legislative autonomy has been 
enhanced significantly to match the political decentralization that was implemented 
beginning in 1993.9
 
As noted, budgetary procedures for the national and state level legislatures are 
spelled out in the constitution. Budgeting is the responsibility of national and state-level 
finance ministries. Bureaucratic support and monitoring are also provided through 
specialized cadres of the civil service. In particular, members of the Indian Civil 
Accounts Service (ICAS), under the Expenditure Secretary of the central Finance 
                                                 
8 The Union, State and Concurrent Lists are in the Seventh Schedule, whereas the new responsibilities of 
rural and urban local governments are in the Eleventh and Twelfth Schedules, added through the 1993 
amendments. See Section 1.3 for details. 
9 In particular, law and order was conspicuously absent from the new local responsibilities, despite 
arguments for some decentralization, and previous experiments in this direction in one or two states. See 
Rao and Singh (2003) for a detailed discussion of this issue. 
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Ministry, deal with maintaining central government accounts, and there are similar state 
level cadres. The Indian Audit and Accounts Service (IAAS), under the independent 
Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAGI), handles auditing of government 
accounts at the national and state levels. Finally, the Indian Revenue Service (IRS) is 
responsible for tax administration at the national level, and there are corresponding state 
level services. At the national level, accounting procedures are relatively strong, and the 
system is reasonably good at detecting certain types of malfeasance. However, various 
kinds of corruption and poor use of funds undoubtedly flourish. In some cases, 
recommendations of the CAGI for procedural improvements are ignored or buried. 
 
While some problems of poor budgeting and expenditure practice exist in the 
national government, the difficulties are magnified at the level of the states. Some states 
are much better than others in terms of their governance traditions, but all of them have 
come under stress in the 1990s, and budget practices have apparently deteriorated in an 
environment of heightened political competition, greater uncertainty, relaxation of 
hierarchical controls, and new complexities of governance. Lack of budgetary autonomy, 
exacerbated by some of the long-standing problems with intergovernmental fiscal 
relations (dealt with in subsequent sections of this paper) also contributes to the states’ 
poor budgetary practices. Shortcomings in budgetary and expenditure practices include 
lack of multi-year budgeting, unrealistic projections, poor tracking of spending and 
outcomes, unclear assignment of responsibilities among different state government 
departments and agencies, lack of transparency, and inappropriate degrees of control – 
too loose in some parts of the process, too tight in others (International Monetary Fund, 
2003, Chapter 4, World Bank, 2005, Chapter 2).  
 
The intergovernmental transfer system involves multiple channels of funding, 
some ad hoc and discretionary, and others implicit (i.e., subsidized loans and others that 
will very probably be forgiven), and has aspects that respond to states’ projected revenue 
gaps. These features encourage unrealistic budgeting to try and enhance transfers, and 
make clear budgeting and proper tracking of spending and outcomes difficult. In 
particular, so-called “plan transfers,” and central ministry transfers for numerous and 
varied projects and programs can include all kinds of conditionalities that distort state-
level decision-making, and cut across functional departmental authorities. At the same 
time, the complexity and poor implementation of these “schemes” undercuts any 
fulfillment of national-level objectives such as correcting for externalities or spillovers. In 
sum, state level budgetary autonomy is sacrificed without any clear compensating welfare 
gain.10
 
The budgetary autonomy of local, particularly rural, governments is much more 
limited than that of the states. There are two dimensions of autonomy, having to do with 
overall funds, and effective control over those funds. One is the per capita total revenue 
of local bodies, or its proportion to state revenue. This can measure how much funding 
the local government has to work with, and how decentralized the system is. An 
                                                 
10 The obvious question arises as to why such an inefficient system persists. Clearly, many of the features 
described favor certain groups that are able to capture government funds in the system as it functions. The 
existence of these groups of beneficiaries must be addressed in any consideration of reform proposals. 
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alternative aspect of autonomy is the amount or proportion of local revenue that is raised 
from own sources, rather than being in the form of transfers of some kind. These 
measures can give quite different pictures. For example, in the period 1995-98, rural local 
bodies in Karnataka ostensibly had about 50 percent of state revenues, but only about 1 
percent of this was from their own sources. In contrast, Haryana’s rural governments’ 
revenues were only 1.7 percent of state revenues, but almost 62 percent was from their 
own sources.11 Per capita total revenue was somewhat higher in Karnataka (Rs. 69 versus 
Rs. 47 for Haryana), but clearly such a comparison would miss the degree to which the 
spending by rural local bodies in Karnataka was constrained by the external source of its 
funds (World Bank, 2004a, Chapter II).  There was considerable variation among the 
states, as illustrated by the above comparison, but the averages were extremely low. 
According to calculations by Chaudhuri (2003), for the 14 major states in this period, 
own revenues were just 3.7 percent of total revenues, and total revenues were just 14.5 
percent of state revenues, over 1995-98. By 2002-03, there had been some improvement 
in some of the states. For example, Maharashtra’s rural local governments raised over 8 
percent of their total revenue themselves in that year, versus about 3 percent in the 1990s. 
Their share of state revenue also went up.12 In the case of Madhya Pradesh, per capita 
revenue went up only slightly, but the proportion of own revenue increased from about 4 
percent in 1995-98 to just over 35 percent. In other states, such as Karnataka, there was 
little difference in the proportion of own revenue, but a significant increase in devolution, 
and hence total rural local revenues. 
 
If one can summarize and generalize with respect to the somewhat heterogeneous 
state of rural local finances and budgetary autonomy, the key points are that both in terms 
of per capita own revenues and total revenues, rural local governments remain severely 
constrained. The assignment of revenue sources is very limited, in most cases much more 
than the spirit of the constitutional amendment might have suggested. Funds that flow 
from state governments not only come with strings attached, but they are disbursed in an 
uneven and uncertain manner, and sometimes fail to come through when promised. Some 
of these budgetary management problems flow from lack of willingness on the part of 
state government actors, and others from lack of capacity (both fiscal and human) on the 
part of state government bureaucracies (World Bank, 2000, 2004a, 2004b; Finance 
Commission, 2004). A further problem has been the lack of capacity at the local level. 
The depth of this problem (compounded by lack of positive efforts at the state 
government level) is illustrated by the fact that grants made by the Eleventh Finance 
Commission to improve the databases and accounts of local bodies (urban and rural) 
remained 70 percent unutilized when the next commission examined the situation almost 
five years later (Finance Commission, 2004, paragraph 8.43). 
 
                                                 
11 These and other figures for this period are taken from Chaudhuri (2003), and calculated from data in the 
report of the Eleventh Finance Commission. 
12 These estimates are based on the author’s calculations from the report of the Twelfth Finance 
Commission (2004, Annexure 8). The figures reported there for the rural local share in state revenues are 
for own revenues, rather than total revenues as in Chaudhuri (2003), but the point is still valid, that both 
dimensions of autonomy “improved.” 
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While urban local bodies share some of the capacity problems of rural 
governments, they are in somewhat better shape with respect to revenue assignments. 
Historically, they have had access to property taxes, and the share of own revenue in their 
total revenue has been much higher than for rural governments. This is unsurprising, 
since urban economies are greater generators of wealth, and have more sophisticated 
institutions in general. However, property tax collections have been deteriorating 
significantly in urban India for decades (Rao and Singh, 2003), and that trend is only now 
being reversed in some cities (World Bank, 2004b). Arguably, while cities and towns had 
tax assignments that gave them the potential to raise significant revenue, the political 
economy of their dependence on state government administration and marginal funding 
eroded incentives to raise own revenues and spend all revenues effectively.13 Thus, even 
though the proportion of own revenues of urban local governments is much higher than 
for rural governments, their budgetary autonomy has been similarly limited. In some 
cases, local governments allowed the property tax to erode as a revenue source because 
they were able to collect “octroi,” a local entry tax on goods. Since octroi is both 
theoretically inefficient, and subject to high implementation costs and corruption in 
practice, some states have abolished it (or replaced it with state-level entry taxes), which 
put pressure on urban governments in those cases. In cases where octroi still is used, 
replacing it with a more effective property tax remains a priority, albeit a difficult task.  
 
Despite the emphasis in the discussion above on the constraints on budgetary 
autonomy that local governments face, with funds that are limited in amount and 
restricted in use, their increased political status and access to formal intergovernmental 
transfers do represent an increase in autonomy over the pre-1993 situation. The new 
status of local governments in India, as a result of de jure decentralization, has served to 
expose some of the longstanding problems that existed with respect to their functioning, 
both in terms of revenue collection and spending.14 This greater transparency should be 
stressed, rather than just transitional difficulties with meeting new expectations in local 
government service delivery. In the case of state governments, the de facto 
decentralization that took place in the 1990s had a different set of impacts. Earlier formal 
and informal hierarchical control mechanisms eroded in their effectiveness, and the 
states’ fiscal situations deteriorated significantly in that decade. 
 
The response to the severe deterioration of the states’ fiscal positions was in 
various attempts to create new budgetary control mechanisms and institutions. Previous 
mechanisms had included intra-party bargaining, borrowing controls enforced by the 
central bank (the Reserve Bank of India, or RBI), and bureaucratic traditions. The first 
                                                 
13 In a parallel fashion, state governments typically not only failed to delegate rural property or land taxes 
to local governments, but allowed them to almost disappear as a source of state level revenue. In both 
cases, the visibility of the property tax makes it politically less attractive than indirect taxes such as sales 
taxes. Rural landowners and urban middle class homeowners may also be effective interest groups. The 
failure to spend tax money effectively is perhaps the root cause of this political difficulty (Rao and Singh, 
2003). 
14 A vestige of the old system is the practice of state governments making ad hoc advances to local 
governments to cover deficits, and then intercepting transfers to recover these advances. This practice 
adversely affects transparency, incentives and general budgeting and accounting processes (World Bank, 
2004b). 
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and third of these began to erode even before the 1990s, while the RBI’s oversight 
became less effective with general economic liberalization which gave state governments 
more freedom of action. This liberalization took place, as noted earlier, in an environment 
of enhanced political competition at the state level. All of these resulted in state 
government actions that led to substantial subnational fiscal deficits, and increased 
borrowing by the states.    
 
Initial attempts by the center to impose conditions on state borrowing that would 
encourage fiscal reforms, were relatively unsuccessful. For example, in 1999-2000, 
eleven states signed Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with the center, promising 
fiscal reforms in exchange for ways and means advances (essentially, overdrafts) on tax 
devolution and grants due to them. In some cases, however, the center had to convert 
these advances into three-year loans. The RBI reported stopping payments to three states 
(Reserve Bank of India, 2001), but the political difficulty of not bailing out states that are 
both poor and populous is obvious. Essentially, this approach was temporary and limited 
in nature, and therefore lacked credibility of commitment.  
 
In a different approach, the Eleventh Finance Commission tried to build 
incentives for fiscal reform into the transfer system, but the manner in which these 
incentives were structured left them too weak to make a difference to state expenditure 
and borrowing decisions. The pool of money that was to be disbursed conditional on 
fiscal reform was too small to matter, and the criteria were perhaps not simple and clear 
enough. The lack of an integrated assessment and control of state finances, and the 
existence of multiple channels of intergovernmental transfers also contributed to the 
relative failure of this approach. 
 
The alternative that seems to have worked partially is that of commitment to 
explicit targets through fiscal responsibility legislation. The central government passed its 
own Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management (FRBM) act in 2003, laying down 
specific targets for deficit reduction. Many state governments have followed the center’s 
lead since then. The RBI provided model legislation, and the Twelfth Finance 
Commission recommended tying debt relief and restructuring for the states to their 
passage and implementation of FRBM laws, to extend the scope and impact of such laws 
to all the states. The Twelfth Finance Commission also recommended minimum 
provisions for state level FRBM laws. While issues remain of enforceability of such laws 
by sovereign governments, or by subnational governments that can count on being bailed 
out, this legislation gets closer to making explicit and credible commitments.  
 
Initial assessments of the impact of the state FRBM laws are quite positive (e.g., 
Howes, 2004). The laws, though not a necessary route to fiscal consolidation, have had a 
positive effect on states’ fiscal positions.15 The advantages of the FRBM route include 
greater transparency, targeting, and monitoring that can together support better overall 
governance. Expenditure quality targets (at least constraining expenditure on salaries) 
                                                 
15 One can conjecture that such laws, especially without sanctions for failing to meet targets, are a 
symptom or symbol of a political consensus with respect to fiscal consolidation, rather than an exogenous 
constraining factor. 
 9
PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE OR CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION 
have been incorporated in FRBM laws. Institutions for effective monitoring still need to 
be developed, however. Options include a new independent scorekeeping body 
(Hausmann and Purfield, 2004), a strengthened Finance Commission (Singh and 
Srinivasan, 2005a), or the ISC acting as a Fiscal Review Council (Singh and Srinivasan, 
2006).  
 
 
1.3. Expenditure responsibility 
The Indian Constitution, in its Seventh Schedule, assigns the powers and 
functions of the center and the states. The schedule specifies the exclusive powers of the 
center (the Union list) and the states (the State list), and those under joint jurisdiction (the 
Concurrent list).  All residuary powers are assigned to the center.  Over time, through 
various amendments, these three lists have been altered in the direction of greater 
centralization, by expanding some powers in the Union List, and shifting some items 
from the State to the Concurrent List. The nature of the assignment of expenditure 
functions (see Table 3) remains fairly typical of federal nations, and broadly fits with 
economists’ theoretical rationale,16 though the breadth of the Concurrent List in some 
cases creates problems of lack of clear responsibility.  
 
The functions of the central government are those required to maintain 
macroeconomic stability, international trade and relations, and those having implications 
for more than one state, state, for reasons of economies of scale and cost-efficient 
provision of public services. Issuing currency and coinage, dealing in foreign exchange, 
foreign loans, the operation of the RBI, international trade, banking, insurance, and 
operation of stock exchanges are some of the major functions assigned to the central 
government to maintain macroeconomic stability. Functions like the operation of 
railways, posts and telegraphs, national highways, shipping and navigation on inland 
waterways, air transport, atomic energy, space, regulation, and development of oilfields 
and major minerals, interstate trade and commerce, and regulation and development of 
interstate rivers are the major functions assigned to the center for reasons economies of 
scale and spillovers in respect of services that have benefits spanning more than one state. 
The major subjects assigned to the states comprise public order, public health, 
agriculture, irrigation, land rights, fisheries and industries and minor minerals. The states 
also assume a significant role for subjects in the Concurrent list, such as education and 
transportation, social security and social insurance. 
 
As noted earlier, formal guidelines for assignments of local subjects were added 
to the constitution in 1993, in the Eleventh and Twelfth Schedules (Table 4). Given the 
structure of the constitution, with local government being a state responsibility, precise 
assignments were made through individual states’ legislations. There was considerable 
                                                 
16 Economic theories of government are based on the idea that public (non-rival and non-exclusive) goods 
are not well provided by the market mechanism.  In addition, if governments are not perfectly informed and 
intrinsically benevolent, subnational governments may be better able to judge the desired levels of local 
public goods, and, potentially, can be given more specific electoral incentives to do so than national 
governments.  Spillovers and economies of scale work in the direction of favoring centralized provision of 
public goods (see, e.g., Olson, 1986). 
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variation among the states in the extent to which the functions in the two new 
constitutional schedules were transferred Rao and Singh, 2003; Chaudhuri, 2003), 
particularly for rural governments. In many cases, states chose to hold back in devolving 
the full list of functions from the Eleventh Schedule. They also capped village level 
authority to directly approve expenditures, often at very low levels. In general, even 
states which devolved significant responsibilities to local governments subsequent to the 
amendments retained control over the requisite funds (as discussed in the previous and 
next sections), as well as the bureaucrats or functionaries who would be responsible for 
implementation. A significant problem with the new local expenditure responsibilities 
has been the overlapping of the “local lists” with the State List. Combined with the lack 
of effective decentralization of funds and personnel, this gives the states the ability to 
overawe local governments completely, if they wish.17 Thus, decentralized expenditure 
responsibilities to local government, while they have been accompanied by some political 
decentralization, arguably still require decentralization in other dimensions to be 
effective. 
  
 
1.4. Revenue authority and collection  
The initial constitutional assignment of tax powers in India was based on a 
principle of separation, with tax categories being exclusively assigned either to the center 
or to the states (Table 5).  Most broad-based taxes were assigned to the center, including 
taxes on income and wealth from non-agricultural sources, corporation tax, taxes on 
production (excluding those on alcoholic liquors) and customs duty. These were often 
taxes where the tax revenue potential was greater, as a result of relatively lower 
collection costs, and higher elasticities with respect to growth. The center was also 
assigned all residual tax powers.  
 
Initially, the central government followed principles that emphasized extreme 
progressivity and narrow targeting, resulting in a very inefficient tax structure (with very 
restrictive import quotas and prohibitively high tariffs being prime examples), and tax 
administration that was highly susceptible to corruption. Economic reform has led to a 
substantial rationalization of the central government tax structure, in terms of lowering 
marginal rates, simplification of the rate structure, and some degree of base broadening. 
This reform agenda was first laid out in the 1991 report of the tax reform committee 
headed by Raja Chelliah, and has been further developed in subsequent reports, notably 
two reports prepared by committees chaired by Vijay Kelkar. In the realm of tax 
administration, however, despite detailed academic analyses (e.g., Das-Gupta and 
Mookherjee, 1998) and recommendations by the same committees, less progress has been 
made, perhaps reflecting general political economy constraints on improving the quality 
of governance through reducing rent-seeking and corruption. 
 
At the subnational level, a long list of taxes was constitutionally assigned to the 
states (Table 5), but only the tax on the sale of goods has turned out to be significant for 
state revenues.  This narrow effective tax base is largely a result of political economy 
                                                 
17 To some extent, the small size of most local governments and their weaker constitutional status makes 
the state-local balance inherently different from that of the center and states. 
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factors (e.g., rural landed interests were initially quite powerful in government at the state 
level) that have eroded or precluded the use of taxes on agricultural land or incomes (and 
also of user charges for public irrigation and even electricity) by state governments. In 
addition, the separation of income tax powers between the center and states based on 
source (agriculture vs. non-agriculture) created avenues for evasion, since the states 
chose not to tax agricultural income.  The greatest inefficiencies arose in indirect taxes. 
Even though in a legal sense taxes on production (central manufacturing excises) and sale 
(state sales taxes) are separate, they tax the same base, causing overlapping and 
cascading, and leaving the states less room to effectively choose indirect tax rates. Also, 
the states were allowed to levy taxes on the sale and purchase of goods (entry 54 in the 
State list) but not services.  This provided avenues for tax evasion, and delayed the design 
and implementation of a comprehensive value added tax (VAT). These issues have been 
a major subject of recent policy and institutional reform initiatives. 
 
One other aspect of the initial assignment of tax powers between the center and 
states deserves detailed attention, because it addresses an important characteristic of a 
federal system, namely, an internal common market. The framers of the constitution were 
aware of the need for a common market, but also included a rather broad escape clause.  
Article 301 of the Constitution states, “Subject to the other provisions of this part, trade, 
commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India shall be free”.  However, 
Article 302 empowers Parliament to impose restrictions on this freedom in the “public 
interest” – a term that is both very broad and not clearly defined in this context.    
 
  The most significant fiscal impediment to free inter-state trade has been the 
manner of levying inter-state sales taxes.  In general, sales taxes have been levied by 
exporting states on the inter-state sale of goods, making the tax origin-based.  On the 
other hand, the constitution’s framers intended that the sales tax system in India should 
be destination based.  While there is no clear theoretical argument for choosing one 
taxation principle over the other, clarity and consistency are virtues, and these were lost 
in the evolution of sales taxation in India. According to Article 286 of the Constitution, 
“No law of a state shall impose, or authorise the imposition of the tax on the sale or 
purchase of goods where such sale or purchase takes place (a) outside the state, or (b) in 
the course of import of goods into, or export of goods out of, the territory of India.”  This 
principle was gutted very early on. Based on the recommendations of a taxation 
commission in 1953, the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution added clauses that enable 
the central government to levy taxes on inter-state transactions. Under these new 
provisions, the central government authorized the states to levy a tax on inter-state sales, 
subject to a specified ceiling rate (4 percent).     
 
 A further problem in tax assignments lies in an inconsistency in constitutional 
provisions. Although Article 286 does not allow restrictions on inter-state transactions, 
entry 52 in the State list empowers the States to levy tax on the entry of goods into a local 
area for consumption, use or sale.  In many states, the tax has been assigned to urban 
local bodies (octroi).  In some states, the local entry taxes were eventually replaced by 
state entry taxes. Thus, taxes are levied not only on the exports from one state to another 
but also on all imports into local areas, including imports from other states.  These entry 
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taxes are destination-based, so the problem of inter-state taxation has had another side as 
well as those created by the amendment to Article 286.  
 
 In the case of local governments, the constitutional amendments provided no 
explicit guidelines for revenue authority. The language of the amendments simply leaves 
such assignment up to the states, which are supposed to decide which taxes local bodies 
may levy themselves, and which state-collected taxes are to be assigned to local 
governments. As we have noted in discussing the budgetary outcomes and autonomy of 
local governments, rural governments in particular do not seem to have adequate sources 
of revenue assigned to them, although for both rural and urban governments, the problem 
is also one of inadequate revenue effort. Even so, revenue authority may be the 
dimension of decentralization where local governments are most constrained. 
 
 Even before the constitutional changes, local governments had a number of taxes 
assigned to them by individual states. Rural local governments had as many as 27 
different taxes (20 exclusive, 7 concurrent with the state government) available to them 
(Datta, 1992).  Exclusive taxes included terminal taxes and octroi; property and building 
taxes; oil engine, food, timber, fishery and produce taxes; and profession and labor taxes.  
Concurrent taxes included those on commercial crops and on land.  For the lowest rural 
government level in some states, land revenue was a significant proportion of revenue, 
though absolute amounts were small in all cases: no rural local tax was a significant 
source of revenue. Twenty different taxes were available to urban governments, nine 
exclusively to them and 11 concurrent with state governments.  In contrast to rural 
governments, several of these were significant revenue sources, particularly octroi and 
property taxes, but also entertainment taxes in some cities. In many cases, even after local 
government reforms, tax assignments remain unclear, and states do not provide assistance 
or guidance to local bodies in implementing tax collection.  
 
Turning to non-tax revenue (from user charges and fees),18 on average this was 
less than tax revenue for rural and urban governments, though the ranking was reversed 
in many states (Twelfth Finance Commission, Annexures 8.8 and 8.9). Poor delivery 
often creates a situation where the imposition of user charges is politically difficult, 
because the benefits are not clear to the payers: a low level equilibrium persists (Rao and 
Singh, 2003). In many cases, unclear or overlapping assignments of expenditure 
responsibility compound problems of accountability and implementation of fees. 
 
 At both the state and local levels, revenue authority falls short of what would 
allow each level to independently meet its expenditure responsibilities. To some extent, 
this is a natural outcome of the different driving forces for assigning revenue authority 
and expenditure responsibility. Most significantly, mobility across jurisdictions increases 
                                                 
18 The most common fees are user charges for water and lighting.  These are typically collected at the 
lowest rural level and, in the absence of monitoring ability, are flat fees.  On the other hand, charges for 
sanitation, or for public events such as fairs and festivals, are rarely assigned or employed.  Panchayats 
(village level councils) are usually not empowered to levy user charges on health and education (with some 
states being exceptions), even though aspects of these functions are assigned to them. User charges in urban 
areas are often extremely low, not just for goods consumed by the poor, but also services such as land 
development (Rao and Singh, 2003). 
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as the size of the jurisdictional unit decreases.  A tax base that is mobile may shrink 
dramatically in response to a tax, making it harder for smaller jurisdictions to raise 
revenue from taxes.  One can think of the problem as being one of tax “capacity”: this 
being lower for states, and still lower for localities.  If this factor implies that more taxes 
should be collected by the center, there will be a tendency for there to be a mismatch 
between revenues and expenditures for subnational jurisdictions, to the extent that 
subnational governments are relatively better able to respond to diversity of 
preferences.19 This is certainly true in India, and is dealt with through significant 
intergovernmental transfers, which are discussed in the next section. 
 
The last dimension of revenues, after statutory assignment and imposition, is 
collection. Collection of taxes and user charges is relatively poor at all levels of 
government. Even the mechanisms for collection of charges between governments or 
government-owned enterprises function poorly, although India has reasonably well-
defined institutions and organizational structures for collection (e.g. the IRS, mentioned 
in Section 1.2. Of course, corruption is a major problem at all levels, so that illegal 
payments substitute for tax or fee collection. Designing administrative systems to control 
corruption is not easy, but can be done, following certain conceptual guidelines (Das-
Gupta and Mookherjee, 1998). Actually doing so is an ongoing issue for policy reform. 
In many cases, the design of tax systems is poor, hindering collection and encouraging 
corruption, and here progress has been made in areas such as the national income tax and 
state sales taxes. However, particularly at the state and local levels, design problems 
remain. Sometimes rates or fees are trivially low, making collection inefficient. In other 
cases, tax rates are prohibitively high, encouraging corruption. Assessment of tax 
liabilities is often done poorly, especially for cases such as the property tax (World Bank, 
2004b). Exemptions of various kinds narrow tax bases, reduce fairness, decrease 
allocative efficiency, and also encourage evasion.  
 
Because tax systems and fee schedules are often poorly designed, they make 
collection more difficult, and this contributes to poor collection rates. For some taxes, 
such as the urban property tax in some cities, collection rates have been abysmally low, 
but problems have also existed for national taxes such as the personal income tax. Poor 
collection rates at the local level are also a reflection of poor accountability, both in 
delivery of public services that are meant to be funded from these taxes and fees, and in 
the collection agencies and their political superiors (see Section 2). Poor revenue 
collection is therefore another aspect of the low level political equilibrium mentioned 
earlier.  Arguably, formal institutions such as the bureaucracy and public enterprises 
function below their potential in this kind of equilibrium. 
 
 
                                                 
19 This problem can be avoided to some extent by coordination of taxes among subnational jurisdictions.  
For example, different states might agree to charge the same minimum sales tax rate or income tax rate.  
Unlike national taxes, these would only be on state-level tax bases, but the incentive for the activities that 
are taxed to move to other, less-taxed locations would be reduced.  There are enforcement problems in such 
agreements, since each state might wish to cheat, either directly reneging, or using nontransparent subsidies 
to compensate for the taxes, say to attract capital to their own jurisdictions.  One response to this might be 
central imposition of this coordination of rates. 
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1.5. Intergovernmental transfers  
The realized outcome of the Indian assignments of tax and expenditure authority, 
their manner of implementation, and the response of different levels of government and 
taxpayers to the assignment and implementation, has been a substantial vertical fiscal 
imbalance. In 2004-2005, the states on average raised about 39 percent of combined 
government revenues, but incurred about 66 percent of expenditures.20  Transfers from 
the center, including tax-sharing, grants and loans made up most of the difference, with 
the states also borrowing moderately from other sources. Focusing on current expenditure 
only, states financed about 58 percent of that total from their own sources of revenue in 
2004-05, up from 52 percent in 2002-2003, but considerably lower than the ratio that had 
prevailed in the early days of the federation. In terms of total expenditure (including 
capital spending), the states covered only about 42 percent by their own revenue receipts 
in that year. There has always been considerable variation across the states in their 
transfer dependence, and the ranking is not completely determined by per capita income. 
For the three years 2000-2003, of the 16 larger states,21 the three with the highest ratios 
of own revenue to revenue expenditure were Haryana (0.78), Maharashtra (0.68) and 
Tamil Nadu (0.65), while the three with the lowest ratios were Bihar (0.25), West Bengal 
(0.32) and Orissa (0.34) (Finance Commission, 2004, Annexure 7.10).  
 
As noted in Section 1.2, local governments are even more dependent on transfers 
from higher levels. In 2002-03, rural local governments’ own source revenues were less 
than 7 percent of their total revenue and less than 10 percent of their current expenditures. 
Urban local bodies did somewhat better, with proportions closer to those of the states. 
They raised about 58 percent of their revenue and covered almost 53 percent of their 
expenditure from own revenue sources. Note that aggregate local government 
expenditure constituted just about 5 percent of total government spending at all levels. 
 
The large vertical fiscal imbalances between levels of government have not been 
unanticipated, and constitutional provisions exist to deal with them. These provisions 
were inserted in the original constitution to cover center-state transfers through the 
creation and operation of a Finance Commission (FC), and those, in turn, served as a 
model for State Finance Commissions (SFCs) mandated by the 1993 local government 
amendments to make state-local transfers. The SFCs were created by individual states, as 
required by the constitutional structure wherein local government is a state subject. In 
both cases, however, other channels of transfer exist. Loans will be treated separately in 
Section 1.6. However, the creation of an apparatus of central planning soon after the 
constitution was ratified led to a complex system of plan transfers which involve both 
subnational levels. This planning mechanism is modeled in some ways on the now 
defunct Soviet system, but has uniquely Indian features of implementation. In addition, 
and somewhat intertwined with the planning system, are various transfers from central 
and state government ministries to lower levels. It is convenient to first treat the three 
                                                 
20 These figures are constructed from various tables in RBI (2006). Both proportions do vary somewhat 
from year to year, and have been subject to political cycles. The estimated figures for 2005-06, calculated 
from the same source, were 38 percent of revenue and 60 percent of expenditure. 
21 This excludes mostly the hill states, which have greater transfer dependence, as well as the small, high-
income state of goa. 
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channels of center-state transfers in turn, and then discuss the various aspects of state-
local transfers together. Data on the composition of center-state transfers is presented in 
Table 6, in which central ministry transfers are classified under “plan transfers.” The 
rationale for this will be discussed later in this section. 
 
Finance Commission Transfers 
The constitution provided for the sharing of the proceeds of certain centrally 
levied taxes (e.g., non-corporate income tax, Article 270; and Union excise duty, Article 
272) with the states, as well as grants to the states from the Consolidated Fund of India 
(under Article 275).  Recent constitutional changes (the 88th amendment, passed in 2000) 
in this scheme have simplified this sharing arrangement, replacing it with an overall share 
of the consolidated fund.  The shares of the center and the states, and their allocation 
among different states are determined by a constitutionally-mandated Finance 
Commission, which is appointed by the President of India every five years (or earlier if 
needed). FC transfers are mostly unconditional in nature. The FCs’ approach to federal 
transfers has consisted of (i) assessing overall budgetary requirements of the center and 
states to determine the resources available for transfer from the center during the period 
of recommendation, (ii) projecting states’ own revenues and non-plan current 
expenditures, (iii) determining the aggregate and individual states’ share of the 
consolidated fund of the center, and (iv) using grants to fill projected expenditure-
revenue gaps remaining after tax devolution.   
 
Twelve FCs have made recommendations to the central government and, with a 
few exceptions, these have been accepted. The Commissions have developed an elaborate 
methodology for dealing with horizontal and vertical fiscal imbalances. In particular, the 
formula for tax devolution is quite complicated, as a result of attempts to capture 
simultaneously disparate or even contradictory factors (Table 7). The result has been that 
the impact of FC transfers on horizontal equity (equalizing fiscal capacity across states) 
has been limited.22 Despite the ad hoc nature of the tax-sharing formula, its persistence 
reflects the nature of precedent that has grown around the FC, even though it is not a 
permanent body, and lacks continuity in its staffing and its analysis. Grants recommended 
by the FCs have typically been based on projected gaps between non-plan current 
expenditures and post-tax devolution revenues. As with tax sharing, these grants have 
generally been unconditional, although some commissions have attempted to enhance 
outlays on specified services in the states by making closed-ended specific purpose non-
matching grants.  In either case, the incentive problems with this “gap-filling” approach 
are obvious. Some commissions did try to incorporate normative growth rates of 
revenues and expenditures in their calculations, but these attempts were selective and 
later ignored.  
 
                                                 
22 See Rao and Singh (2005) and World Bank (2005). The exception is the so-called ‘special category’ 
states. These are hilly states on India’s borders, with strategic importance as well as cost disabilities in 
public good provision. Bagchi and Chakraborty (2003) provide some illustrative calculations of how 
transfers would need to change to achieve greater horizontal equalization for the major states. 
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Planning Commission Transfers 
While the FC decides on tax shares and makes grants, a completely separate body, 
the Planning Commission, makes grants and loans (in the ratio 30:70 for the major 
states)23 for implementing development plans. As development planning gained 
emphasis, the Planning Commission became a major dispenser of such funds to the 
states, and it also coordinates central ministry transfers: almost one-third of center-state 
transfers are made through these channels (Table 6).  As there is no specific provision in 
the Constitution for such plan transfers, the central government channeled them under the 
miscellaneous (and limited) provisions of Article 282.  Before 1969, plan transfers were 
project-based. Since then, the distribution has been done on the basis of a consensus 
formula (see Table 8) decided by the National Development Council (NDC).24 As in the 
case of the FC, the Planning Commission formula tries to aggregate disparate objectives 
in its calculations, with the result that the overall impact is less than clear.  
 
One major contrast with the FC is the conditional nature of Planning Commission 
transfers, since they are earmarked for “developmental” purposes. However, while the 
special category states receive plan transfers based on projects that they formulate and 
submit, the general category states’ plan transfers are not related to the required size or 
composition of plan investments. Hence there is not even implicit matching of states’ 
own resource commitments in this transfer channel, let alone an explicit matching 
formula. The process for determining plan transfers involves competing proposals from 
the Planning Commission and the states, with a certain amount of bargaining through the 
NDC, as well as in state-by-state discussions, to determine plan loans and grants. At the 
end of this process, the Planning Commission approves the state plans. The allocation 
and spending process does appear to distort states’ budgeting and expenditure decisions, 
and not necessarily in ways that are desired by the center or more socially efficient. 
 
Central Ministry Transfers 
Various ministries give grants to their counterparts in the states for specified 
projects, either wholly funded by the center (central sector projects) or requiring the 
states to share the cost (centrally sponsored schemes). The ostensible rationale for these 
programs is financing activities with a high degree of inter-state spillovers, or which are 
merit goods (e.g., poverty alleviation and family planning), but they are often driven by 
pork-barrel objectives. These projects are supposed to be monitored by the Planning 
Commission, and coordinated with the overall state plans – which is why they are listed 
under Plan transfers as in Table 6 – but both monitoring and coordination are relatively 
ineffective. There are well over 100 schemes, and attempts to consolidate them into broad 
sectoral programs have been unsuccessful, though they continue. These programs have 
provided the central government with an instrument to actively influence states’ 
spending, replacing pre-1969 plan transfers in this role. The proliferation of schemes may 
also have increased the size and control of the bureaucracy.  While the NDC recently 
                                                 
23 The special category states receive a much higher proportion (90 percent) of their Plan fund allocations 
as grants. 
24 The NDC is chaired by the Prime Minister, and its members include all central cabinet ministers, Chief 
Ministers of the states, and members of the Planning Commission. Like the ISC, it serves as a bargaining 
and log-rolling body, though with a much narrower scope. 
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appointed an investigative committee that recommended scaling down and consolidating 
centrally sponsored schemes, implementation of this proposal was weak: new proposals 
have recently been floated with similar objectives. For all channels of center-state 
transfers, but particularly more discretionary transfers such as ministry grants, there is 
some evidence (Section 2.4) that political factors influence allocations across states. 
 
State-Local Transfers  
Local government reform instituted a system of formal state-local transfers 
modeled on the Finance Commission component of the existing center-state system.  
However, the new SFCs have struggled to formulate the principles for sharing or 
assigning state taxes, tolls, and fees and for making grants-in-aid. There remains 
considerable variation in the quality of analysis, methodologies used, and implementation 
of transfers across the different states. Lack of political will at the state level and, perhaps 
most significantly, the states’ own fiscal problems have restricted progress in this 
dimension. Some states have been slow to constitute SFCs, and some have been tardy in 
implementing their recommendations. The outcome has been significant uncertainty, 
which hampers effective use of funds by local governments. Sometimes, SFC 
recommendations have been significantly ignored by state governments. Nevertheless, 
the SFC system has made local government financing more transparent.25  
 
While detailed and accurate data on the nature of state-local transfers (especially 
in terms of the source of the funds and the effective degree of conditionality) remains 
elusive (Finance Commission, 2004, Chapter 8),26 some recent studies have collected 
such data (World Bank, 2004a) and the FC itself has compiled data provided by state 
governments. Table 9 reports the percentage composition of local revenues, showing the 
mix of grants and tax sharing for rural and local governments. The former, in particular, 
can be seen to rely heavily on grants. These data include FC grants made to augment to 
consolidated funds of the states, but earmarked for local governments. They also 
sometimes27 include Planning Commission transfers to the states that are then further 
devolved to local governments. The latter, in particular, are project or program-based 
categorical grants, but the FC has also included its own earmarks, for example for 
improving accounting and databases, and for waste management, and the states often add 
their own conditionalities. As a result, local revenues, particularly for rural governments, 
include a large component of funds, the spending of which is predetermined by higher 
level agencies (e.g., Rajaraman, 2001). 
 
 As noted, the various SFCs have used a wide range of approaches to allocate 
funds among local governments under their purview.28 To some extent, this is consistent 
                                                 
25 In fact, the problems of uncertainty and arbitrariness in state-local fiscal relations are a heritage of the 
old system of discretionary control, rather than a consequence of reform (Rao and Singh, 2003). 
26 In particular, the data does not yet permit an analysis of political economy determinants of state-local 
transfers, whether with respect to variation across localities or over time. Since data before the reforms is 
essentially non-existent, one cannot ever examine the impact of reform per se. However, over time, it may 
be possible to isolate political economy factors in changes in the pattern of stat-local transfers. 
27 There is a lack of consistency in accounting and reporting among the states in this respect. 
28 See PRIA (2005a) for a recent summary of SFC recommendations across states. The latest FC report 
(Finance Commission, 2004, Annexure 8.10) summarizes the timing status of individual SFC reports. In 
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with a philosophy of decentralization: objectives may differ across the states. However, it 
does not justify the lack of any coherent approach within a state, nor poor quality of 
analysis (Finance Commission, 2004; PRIA, 2005b). While the FC itself is not immune 
to methodological criticism, its functioning has been comparatively of a much higher 
standard, right from the institution’s inception. Perhaps the complexity and size of the 
task facing the SFCs, including the large number of local governments with multiple tiers 
and great heterogeneity, as well as resistance from state-level politicians and bureaucrats 
explains the quality difference as much as the novelty of the exercise. The FC itself uses 
a modification of its basic approach for center-state transfers in making grants to the 
states that are earmarked for local governments: various criteria are weighted and 
combined to determine allocations across the states (Table 10). 
 
 
1.6. Borrowing by subnational units  
The constitution (Article 293) specifies borrowing rules for state governments. 
States cannot borrow abroad, and they require central government approval for domestic 
borrowing whenever they are in debt to the center. In fact, that condition has prevailed 
almost invariably, since the central government was, until fairly recently, the states’ main 
source of lending, and every state is indebted to the center. Currently, central loans make 
up about 22 percent of the states’ debt stock (RBI, 2006b, Appendix Table 36). 
Operationally, the RBI, as central bank, manages the debt of all levels of government, 
and, in the past, typically did not allow market borrowing by state governments that were 
already indebted. 
 
Central loans are made under the supervision of the Planning Commission (PC), 
and have been tied to PC grants in a fixed proportion. Central loans also include funds 
from multilateral agencies or other external sources, which are earmarked for specific 
programs and projects in particular states. After the reforms of the 1990s, states have 
more freedom to negotiate directly with multilaterals, and the center plays combined 
roles of approver, guarantor and intermediary.29 Finally, there can be ad hoc central loans 
based on special circumstances or exigencies in individual states, and short term ways 
and means advances to provide revenue smoothing. 
 
Until 1999-2000, a second category of borrowing by the states was included in 
central loans: the center served as intermediary for states’ drawing on the National Small 
Savings Fund, consisting of mostly rural savings collected through post offices. In that 
year, NSSF loans were separated out in the government accounts,30 and have been 
                                                                                                                                                 
most cases, these reports are not easily accessible, and even the FC itself reported difficulties in acquiring 
the requisite information. 
29 This role has implications for the impact of structural adjustment lending (SAL) by multilaterals to 
support fiscal consolidation – the conditionalities in such loans can be counteracted by the moral hazard 
inherent in central government guarantees. In fact, Chakraborty and Rao (2006), in a detailed empirical 
analysis, tackle this issue and find mixed evidence for positive impacts of SAL on fiscal outcomes. 
30 The accounting change explains why the latest FC’s report (Finance Commission, 2004, Chapter 12), 
offers a different calculation of the makeup of state debt, than ours, which is directly from the RBI’s figures 
(RBI, 2006, Appendix Table 36). The NSSF facility was also used in a debt swap scheme in 2004-05, to 
reduce states’ older, high interest rate debt. 
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nominally securitized, though this remains a captive source of funds. This category 
makes up about 27 percent of states’ debt stock, and the proportion is likely to increase. 
The interest rate paid to small savers is set by the center, and is higher than market rates, 
or rates for bank deposits. Effectively, since the center is guarantor, the new accounting 
brings greater transparency but does nothing to change the incentives of the state 
governments. 
 
Yet another captive source of borrowing for the states is the mandated pension 
and insurance contributions of state government employees, minus any payouts that 
occur. This category accounted for about 12 percent of the states’ liabilities in 2005-06. 
Another, less automatic, but also somewhat captive source of borrowing has been state-
owned financial institutions such as the Life Insurance Corporation of India, and various 
public sector banks. This accounts for 6 percent of state debt. While this was a small 
proportion of debt, it was one of the fastest growing components of state debt over the 
preceding decade.31
 
States also “borrow” by delaying payment of bills, and as they came under fiscal 
stress in the 1990s, this became an increasingly important, albeit precarious means of 
financing deficits at the state level. One important case of this form of financing by 
running up arrears was in the case of State Electricity Boards, state-government-owned 
utilities that failed to pay their bills to the National Thermal Power Corporation, the 
central government-owned utility company. Some of these deficits and debts were off-
budget, and some states also tried off-budget special purpose vehicles to raise funds 
outside the formal institutional controls of government borrowing. As one might expect, 
the center and RBI have cracked down on these practices by issuing explicit 
supplementary orders, and by changing payment procedures in the case of electric power. 
 
All the state level borrowing channels described so far involve either active 
central government participation, or central complicity through guarantees, permission, 
and support. In fact, public sector financial institutions are an important source of captive 
financing for the central government as well. One can view the traditional methods of 
hierarchical control of state level borrowing as coming under strain as states looked for 
expedient ways to relieve their fiscal difficulties (including borrowing to fund as much as 
50 percent current expenditures). In addition, the political power of the center versus the 
states arguably declined in this period. The upshot of these developments favors a 
different approach to borrowing controls, using central authority to set up rules, but 
allowing market-based discipline to govern borrowing. 
 
Market borrowing has always been available to the states, subject to national 
government control and discretion, as noted earlier, but its use has increased somewhat in 
the last few years. For many years, the proportion of market borrowing in state financing 
of their gross fiscal deficits was in the range of 15-20 percent. In 2002-03, the proportion 
was 28 percent, and 38 and 30 percent in the next two years. It has subsequently come 
                                                 
31 Market borrowing and NSSF loans were the two largest sources of new borrowing by the states, though 
the latter, as noted, represented an accounting change, substituting for previous “round-tripped” central 
government loans. Borrowing from pension and insurance schemes also grew rapidly in this period. 
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down in 2005-06, to just over 15 percent, but may well rise again, because of specific 
institutional proposals to increase the importance of market borrowing for the states. 
Currently, market borrowing makes up almost 20 percent of the states’ debt stock. 
However, much of this borrowing has been through private placements with financial 
institutions, and interest rates are controlled. More recently, some states have raised funds 
through bond auctions, with market-determined rates. As noted above, there is also some 
off-budget borrowing by state level public sector enterprises. 
 
The latest FC report (Finance Commission, 2004, p.12) has made the 
recommendation that “The Central Government should not act as an intermediary for 
future lending and allow the states to approach the market directly, through issuing 
bonds. If some financially weak states are unable to raise funds from the market, the 
center could borrow for the purpose of on-lending to such states, but the interest rates 
should remain aligned to the marginal cost of borrowing for the Center.” This 
recommendation moves institutions in the right direction for more efficient fiscal 
management, but there are still weaknesses in what is envisaged. Direct access to the 
market usually means that states deemed too risky to lend by the market have to pay a 
higher interest rate, and this in turn would provide an incentive for such states to be 
fiscally more responsible and be perceived as less risky.  Any on-lending to fiscally weak 
states at about the market rate for central loans would simply dilute the incentive to be 
fiscally strong that direct access to the market induces. Instead, the Commission could 
have recommended that all states have to access the market directly, with some relatively 
poor states receiving grants that are designed so as not to distort marginal incentives. 
 
The new proposals would represent a major shift in the subnational borrowing 
regime, since even past market borrowing by the states has been with implicit or explicit 
guarantees of the central government.32 It is still possible that state governments will 
require bailouts in extraordinary circumstances, but a priori market discipline can restrict 
the frequency of such occurrences. Note that true market discipline will require other 
sources of borrowing and central government guarantees to be limited, and lenders to also 
face the test of the market.33 In particular, the states must not have easy access to captive 
sources of finance, including nationalized financial institutions.34 The RBI is exploring 
the development of institutions to support this shift to market borrowing, including 
offering mechanisms, secondary markets for government debt, credit ratings, and 
methods of regulation and monitoring. The FC has proposed ceilings on aggregate 
borrowing (including state-level guarantees) and debt, and these would be an important 
component of a market borrowing regime. Several states have included such limits in 
their FRBM legislations. 
                                                 
32 Hence, there has not been a true assessment of the creditworthiness of different states, and the rating 
agencies do not independently rate the states. In this context, note that central government control of 
essentially all borrowing by the states has allowed it to make implicit transfers through subsidized loans 
(Rao and Singh, 2005, Chapter 9). 
33 There is a subtle issue related to the overall degree of transfer dependence, and the existence of implicit 
guarantees, which is discussed in Section 4.5. I am grateful to Jonathan Rodden for emphasizing this point. 
34 Thus, this kind of fiscal reform is ultimately closely tied to, and dependent on, financial sector reform 
(Singh and Srinivasan, 2005a, 2005b). In the past, the center has regularly bailed out states through debt 
forgiveness, and this would have to be controlled.  
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Investment expenditures whose benefits will accrue in the future are natural 
candidates for financing through borrowing, and, to the extent that many local services 
require infrastructure (local roads, streetlights, parks), borrowing is potentially important 
for local governments.  The efficiency argument for tax collection to be performed by 
higher levels of government applies for borrowing as well, but the resulting incentive 
problems can be severe.  Local government borrowing in India has been ad hoc and 
limited in nature.  While rural local governments were insignificant borrowers, urban 
governments increasingly went into debt even before local government reforms, though 
with substantial differences across states (N.R. Rao, 1986) Almost all such debt was that 
of municipal corporations and of port trusts (with large, specialized infrastructure 
requirements.  Borrowing was via nationalized banks or other government-owned 
financial institutions.  In many cases,  the distinction between loans made by state 
governments as part of the planning process, and institutional financing of local projects, 
also routed through the states, was blurred (Datta, 1992). Current data (Finance 
Commission, 2004, Annexures 8.8 and 8.9) suggests that rural government borrowing 
was about 1 percent of expenditures for rural governments, and 10 percent for urban 
governments. 
 
Numerous repayment problems with local level borrowing, going back at least to 
the 1960s, are noteworthy in the light of the stringent statutory restrictions on local 
governments in India.  These included restrictions on rates, amounts, aggregate 
borrowing and length of terms.  Individual loans require approval of the state and or the 
central government, as well as consultation with and approval of the RBI.  Open market 
borrowings have also been subject to higher-level government and RBI supervision and 
approval (Datta, 1984). Local government reform has had only a marginal impact on the 
previous situation, especially for rural governments. The SFCs have been charged with 
making recommendations with respect to loans, but the ability to assess projects and 
monitor outcomes is already beyond the state governments’ capacity.  
 
In 1999, the center announced that village level governments (panchayats) would 
be allowed to borrow from the Rural Infrastructure Development Fund to provide roads, 
primary education centers, rural health centers and drinking water in villages. The 
evidence indicates that panchayats did access and disburse these loans to some extent 
(World Bank, 2000). In the absence of adequate revenue sources, however, it is not clear 
if this mechanism can be implemented to any great degree. In some cases, rural local 
bodies have been able to get loans from public sector banks for small infrastructure 
projects such as constructing marriage halls. These kinds of collateralized loans are made 
marginally easier by the firmer status of local governments after reform. 
 
Larger urban governments, as before reform, continue to rely on loans from state 
governments and government financial institutions for infrastructure financing. In many 
cases, state government departments intercept transfers to these local governments to 
collect repayments, creating uncertainty in planning and confusion in accounting (World 
Bank, 2004b). A relatively new development has been the issuance of bonds by a few 
urban bodies, including municipal corporations as well as specialized government 
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organizations such as water supply agencies. The Maharashtra SFC had explicitly 
recommended the development of a market for bonds for urban and rural local 
governments, with ratings by agencies such as CRISIL (Credit Rating Information 
Services of India Limited), CARE (Credit Analysis and Research, Ltd.) and ICRA 
(Indian Credit Rating Agency). CRISIL, CARE and ICRA each currently list ratings on 
about a dozen or so urban local bodies on their web sites, these being mostly for 
governments or agencies in western and southern India. Box 2 provides one example of 
these ratings.  
 
 
Box 2: Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation Bond Ratings 
 
Rs. 1000 Million Tax-Free Bonds (Property Tax) - 2002 AA (so)/Stable (Reaffirmed)  
Rs. 580 Million Tax-Free Bonds (Property & Octroi) - 2004 AA (so)/Stable (Reaffirmed)  
Rs. 1000 Million Tax-Free Bonds (Property & Octroi) - 2005 AA (so)/Stable (Reaffirmed)  
Rs. 334 Million Taxable Bonds (Octroi) - 1998 AA (so)/Stable (Rating Withdrawn) 
 
CRISIL's 'AA (so)/Stable' ratings on the bonds issued by the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (AMC) 
are based on the corporation's stable financial risk profile and the credit enhancement mechanism provided 
for each bond by escrow of octroi and/or property tax collections from designated nakas/zones. The credit 
enhancement mechanism operates through a trustee-administered escrow account. The current 
reaffirmation is subject to the trustee(s) confirming compliance with all aspects, including legal 
documentation and stipulated payment mechanism by July 19, 2006 and fully capitalising the sinking fund 
to provide for the upcoming put/ call option for 2002 Tax-Free Bonds (Property Tax Bonds) by July 30, 
2006. The ratings are also based on the corporation's buoyant revenues, healthy revenue surplus levels, 
strong economic base, and good economic management. These rating strengths are partly offset by the 
corporation's high indebtedness levels.  
AMC has maintained healthy surpluses, driven by buoyant revenue receipts (RR). During 2004-05 (refers 
to financial year, April 1 to March 31), the corporation's operating surplus stood at Rs. 2980 million 
compared with an operating surplus of Rs. 1890 million in 2003-04. The growth in surpluses has been 
driven by strong growth in octroi and property tax collections over the last two years, which is expected to 
sustain over the medium term. AMC has a strong and diversified economic base, encompassing well 
developed industrial, commercial, and residential segments. AMC has also displayed good economic 
management with respect to property tax reforms and good service arrangements.  
The current rating, however, remains constrained by AMC's high levels of indebtedness. The corporation's 
indebtedness ratio of 52 per cent, as measured by the debt to RR ratio, and debt levels at Rs. 4210 million 
(as on March 31, 2005), compare unfavourably with other CRISIL-rated municipal corporations. The levels 
are high due to substantial debt-funded capital expenditure since 2003-04. CRISIL believes that AMC's 
future indebtedness levels will be contingent on extent of debt-funding of its capital expenditure and extent 
of financial support provided to Sabarmati River Front Development Corporation.  
Outlook: Stable  
CRISIL expects the buoyancy in the revenues of AMC to continue, driven by strong octroi and property tax 
collections. Further, the debt levels should remain under control, with the funding of its planned capital 
expenditure mainly through grants.  
About the corporation:  
AMC is the largest municipal corporation in Gujarat. AMC covers an area of around 190.80 square kms 
and provides a range of civic services to around 3.6 million citizens (2001 census) of Ahmedabad and the 
peripheral areas that come under its municipal limits.  
 
Source: http://www.crisil.com/credit-ratings-risk-assessment/outstanding-ratings-list.htm, accessed August 
31, 2006 
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2. Diagnosis of Accountability Mechanisms 
In the context of governance, accountability means that members and agents of 
government, i.e., politicians, employees and contractors are ultimately answerable to the 
citizens who provide the funds for their functioning, through taxes, fees and loans. For 
most of government, accountability is somewhat indirect, operating through 
organizational hierarchies. Only politicians are directly answerable to citizens through 
elections,35 and these are based on aggregate and incomplete assessments by citizens of 
politicians’ performance. Day-to-day accountability of politicians works through 
mechanisms such as the answerability of the executive to the legislature, the oversight of 
the judiciary, and general checks and balances within government. A federal structure 
adds the electoral dimension of accountability to subnational governments, but this can 
complicate the task of citizens in trying to assess performance. 
 
One can categorize two fundamental types of accountability: (1) that of elected 
officials to citizens and (2) that of other government employees to elected officials (e.g., 
Littvack and Seddon, 1999). The first can also be termed accountability through “voice” 
(Hirschman, 1970) or political accountability (World Bank, 2004b). The second is more 
complex, since there can be vertical and horizontal chains of accountability within 
government as a whole, and within specific parts of government. Thus, this type of 
accountability includes “hierarchy” as a mechanism (Littvack, Seddon and Bird, 1998) as 
well as checks and balances (Rao and Singh, 2003). One can also term this as “internal” 
accountability (World Bank, 2004b), broadening that usage to include checks and 
balances.36 Section 2.1 assesses India’s internal accountability mechanisms, with an 
emphasis on the hierarchical mechanisms that operate across levels of government.37  
 
One mechanism that provides external accountability is what Hirschman termed 
“exit.” Citizens may exit in two ways, either by shifting jurisdictions, or by going to the 
private sector for fulfilling wants that the government fails to provide adequately or 
effectively. In either case, the key enabler of exit is competition, between jurisdictions or 
between public and private provision. Intergovernmental competition in India is 
considered in Section 2.2. The issue of private versus public provision of what have 
traditionally been public services is postponed to Section 3.2, in the context of an 
integrated discussion of service delivery. A different kind of intergovernmental 
                                                 
35 In India, the broad use of public interest legislation can be seen as citizens’ using the judiciary to 
improve accountability of politicians, where electoral accountability is weak.  
36 These are typically ignored, except for Rao and Singh (2003), in the literature cited here, which treats 
government as a dichotomous entity of elected and non-elected officials and neglects the broader 
dimensions of within-government accountability. Kapur and Mehta (2006) consider the functioning of the 
Indian national parliament as an institution of accountability for the executive. In considering forms of 
accountability, note that public interest legislation (see previous footnote) can be interpreted as a hybrid of 
external (government-citizen) and internal accountability. 
37 One can possibly also distinguish “social” accountability (World Bank, 2004b), referring to the 
accountability of front-line service delivery units of government to clients. It seems that this is really a 
derivative of joint political and internal accountability. Yet another aspect of accountability (Littvack and 
Seddon, 1999) is a division along quasi-functional lines: political, fiscal and administrative. Again, it seems 
that fiscal accountability, while very significant, is a joint product of political and administrative (internal) 
accountability. 
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competition is considered in Section 2.3, focusing on the important dimension of capital 
for investment at the subnational level. Traditionally, subnational governments in India 
compete for funds from higher level governments. The shift toward market borrowing 
replaces this internal, hierarchical accountability with accountability to the market, and to 
citizens as investors. Finally, Section 2.4 considers the core dimension of electoral 
accountability and its working at the subnational level in India. 
 
 
2.1. Hierarchical mechanisms   
  India’s states, because of their relative linguistic and cultural homogeneity, have 
been natural loci and arenas for political organization. As discussed in Section 1.1, in the 
early days after independence, regional (as well as ideological) differences were mediated 
through a national political coalition. A strong central party leadership was able to 
enforce a degree of accountability of state governments, in some cases replacing regional 
leaders as state chief ministers. One provision of the Constitution that has been used the 
most to exercise hierarchical political control is Article 356 of the constitution, which 
allows the governor of a state to advise the president that the government of the state is 
unable to carry on “in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution”, and allows 
the president to assume “to himself all or any of the functions of the Government of the 
State”.  In practice, “President’s Rule” means rule by the prime minister and the ruling 
party at the center.  
 
It is debatable whether the use of Article 356 in practice increased overall 
accountability. Specifically, accountability of the states to the center through this 
constitutional provision did not translate into better accountability of elected officials to 
their constituents: rather, the opposite was the case. State-level elected politicians were, 
to some extent, able to claim central interference as a reason for lack of performance. 
Interestingly, as political decentralization has increased, with the emergence of strong, 
independent regional parties, the use of Article 356 has been challenged more 
successfully, and its invocation has declined.38
 
The situation of state-local hierarchical accountability in the political arena was 
much more extreme than the center-state case. While there is a constitutional limit on the 
length of President’s Rule in a state, there was no limit in the case of local governments 
being superseded by states. Before the passage of the constitutional amendments on local 
government, at any given time since independence, 40-50 per cent of local government 
bodies in India had been under state supersession (Dillinger, 1994). Even where there 
were provisions for direct rural local elections, they could be ignored at the discretion of 
the state government – in Tamil Nadu, for example, rural local elections were not held for 
a stretch of 15 years.  
                                                 
38 Brass (1994) argues that the increased use of Article 356 to impose President's Rule in the states was a 
response to increasing political decentralization, rather than an indicator of a movement in the other 
direction. This is not inconsistent with the argument here, which suggests that what Brass highlighted was a 
temporary phenomenon and unsuccessful response in the long run. There are several other provisions in the 
constitution which allow central intervention in state-level politics. See Rao and Singh (2005, Chapter 3) 
for details. 
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The 1993 amendments place a limit of six months (the same as President’s Rule) 
on the period of supersession of any local government. While state governments may 
continue to try and postpone local elections when it suits them  (and this has been 
happening) they will no longer have the law on their side. In the context of 
accountability, it is important to re-emphasize (as was discussed in earlier sections), that 
this system of strong hierarchical political control did not translate into good performance 
in delivery of public goods and services. If accountability can be inferred from such 
performance, then the basic accountability of government to citizens does not appear to 
have been enhanced by hierarchical accountability. 
 
It can be counter-argued that the situation may have been worse without higher 
level government intervention, and that possibility must be considered. In other words, 
higher level “takeovers” may be justified responses to poor lower-level performance. 
This is difficult to assess empirically, but it does suggest that day-to-day accountability 
mechanisms, operating mainly through the bureaucracy, may be more important than 
observation of extreme measures. As our discussion in earlier sections would indicate, 
these are quite different at the state versus the local level.  
 
States have a reasonably well-defined locus of authority, and longstanding, 
competent bureaucracies. While they depend on the center for a significant portion of 
their funds, there is a relatively transparent and independent (though not optimal) 
procedure for making these transfers.  Tax sharing and unconditional grants through the 
FC require no formal accountability to the central government. Even PC grants are 
mainly formula-based, and while the PC is nominally responsible for monitoring 
outcomes and could conceivably adjust future transfers based on performance, this does 
not happen at all. It is only central ministry transfers, in the form of various “schemes,” 
where conditionalities are built in very strongly. Again, however, the actual monitoring 
of the use of even these funds is poor,39 and one can characterize the hierarchical 
accountability of the use of funds through center-state transfers as weak. Note that this is 
distinct from a formal maintenance of budgets and accounts, since the state government 
accounts are typically reasonably well-maintained40 at a formal, aggregate level. The 
RBI, acting as an agent of the center, collects data and reports on the states’ finances, 
providing an accurate overall picture, and the states’ own accounts give further details. 
 
State level bureaucracies are also connected to the national bureaucracy, and this 
affiliation creates another avenue of accountability. The Indian bureaucracy, as conceived 
by the British (and to some extent, the Mughals before them) was designed to maintain 
basic law and order and efficient revenue collection. The system was built around district 
                                                 
39 Matters are complicated by the poor design and large number of these various schemes, in addition to 
poor incentives for implementation. More recently, some states under fiscal stress have liberally used 
transfers supposedly earmarked for developmental projects to meet their basic salary obligations. Examples 
of studies of state-level financial accountability mechanisms include World Bank (2006b), on Punjab. 
Further references, for World Bank studies of other states, are contained in that document. 
40 The quality of budgeting and accounting varies across states, and there are problems common to all 
states. See World Bank (2004b), and the references in the previous footnote. 
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level administrators with substantial powers and discretion. Independence saw attempts 
to expand the duties of these administrators to encompass a whole range of functions 
meant to promote economic development. State level political control became more 
important than in the past, as democratic institutions supplemented hierarchical 
administrative control. The core of the state-level bureaucracy (the IAS and Indian Police 
Service) remains tied to the central bureaucracy, but the accountability that this creates 
(through competition for promotion to the highest level central posts) is countervailed by 
political pressures that can vary across states. Specifically, corrupt politicians at the state 
level can override hierarchical accountability mechanisms that are internal to the 
bureaucracy.  
 
In addition to direct political pressures on bureaucrats that distort supposedly 
impartial administrative decision-making, there are distortionary incentive mechanisms 
such as frequent transfers of bureaucrats. Even in the 1950s, transfers were used to 
reward and punish bureaucrats (e.g., Sivaraman, 1991). In some cases, transfers are a part 
of an elaborate rent-seeking and rent-distribution mechanism, where administrators and 
politicians may be equally complicit (e.g., Wade, 1989; De Zwart, 1994). One theoretical 
justification for transfers41 is that of reducing corruption by reducing opportunities for 
enduring corrupt relationships to develop between bureaucrats and their clients, but in 
practice the frequency, variability and arbitrariness of transfers is much greater than 
would be indicated by any such justification. The outcome is that the bureaucracy’s role 
in carrying out administrative policies that are derived from underlying legislative goals 
is severely hampered. One can view this problem as resulting from a situation in which 
political accountability weakens the hierarchical bureaucratic accountability that is 
subordinated to it, but is itself ineffective. Better insulation of bureaucratic transfers from 
inappropriate political pressures (i.e., driven by rent-seeking and corruption rather than 
by citizen preferences) is a significant component of an emerging reform agenda for the 
Indian civil services (e.g., Saxena, 2005).42
 
At the local level, the situation is different because of the continuing political, 
financial and administrative limitations on local governments, despite their new 
constitutional status. Some of the problems are structural. Most obviously, the 
insufficient assignment of revenue authority constrains local governments in all three of 
these dimensions. There are also structural limitations in the new political arrangements, 
ostensibly designed to promote political accountability, but serving in practice to 
maintain control of resources by elected officials of the state and national governments. 
This is particularly true for rural governments: members of parliament and of state 
legislatures can serve on governing councils at the block (intermediate) and district 
levels. In essence, the pre-reform system of hierarchical control of local governments 
remains largely intact. 
                                                 
41 An additional, more positive rationale comes from the benefits of varied experience that come with 
rotation of assignments, especially for younger bureaucrats. 
42 Reform attempts are as old as the problems, and the Indian government has made various attempts at 
administrative reform, going back at least to the 1960s (Rao and Singh, 2005). Howes, Lahiri and Stern 
(2003) and Kapur and Mehta (2005) include various previous academic studies of administrative reform 
issues for India, and comparisons to other countries. 
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This pre-reform hierarchical accountability system was ineffective in delivering 
services at the local level (see Section 3.3 below). At the same time, examples of misuse 
of funds through incompetence, malfeasance, or both, were common before reform (Rao 
and Singh, 2003).  The level of auditing, both quantitatively and qualitatively, was 
inadequate, applying not just to the identification of irregularities, but also to the 
enforcement of minimum accounting standards.  Also, more effort was devoted to other 
kinds of monitoring rather than to auditing or performance monitoring. Local government 
in India involved excessive control of inputs and process, to the detriment of attention to 
performance and outcomes43.  Examples were common of detailed approval required 
from higher level governments for relatively small projects or expenditures, sometimes as 
part of a top-down national and state planning exercise in which local governments had 
little input.  At the same time, performance could often be neglected, with overdue and 
abandoned projects being common. In sum, the implementation of accountability through 
‘hierarchy’ has been flawed.  
 
An additional aspect of this situation is that the (external, political) accountability 
of state governments for local government performance has itself been weak. Hierarchy 
as a mechanism for accountability just pushes a greater burden on to ‘voice’ at a higher 
government level.  This conceptual point does not seem to have been explicitly 
recognized in the evolving literature on decentralization44.  Another point that deserves 
consideration is that hierarchical accountability may have an inherent tendency to 
undermine assignments of authority to lower-level governments.  This is the fundamental 
problem of the higher-level government in a federal system ‘overawing’ lower-level 
governments (Riker, 1975). 
 
Interestingly, post-reform, the central government has been seeking to increase 
the accountability of state governments for local government performance. After the last 
general election, in May 2004, the new government at the center proposed transferring 
money directly to local governments, rather than through the states. As one might expect, 
this was vigorously opposed by the states. The last three FCs, which reported after the 
1993 reforms, have also worked to get the states to carry out their constitutionally 
mandated and legislated responsibilities to local governments, in addition to directly 
supporting local government capacity building through various conditional and 
unconditional transfers (all required to be channeled through the states). As the FC 
reports make clear, one of the main problems in holding local governments accountable 
for their own performance, and state governments for local performance, is the lack of 
reliable and detailed data: information and transparency are key inputs for any kind of 
accountability mechanism to work. 
                                                 
43 The choice between input and output monitoring is a complicated one, since certain means may be 
undesirable in themselves, if they involve corruption or illegality, even though the ends are thus achieved.  
Mookherjee (1997) analyzes these and other issues in a model of tax administration.  See also the 
references in that piece. 
44 See, for example, World Bank (1997), Litvack et al (1998), and Litvack and Seddon (1999).  Such 
analyses tend to appeal to lack of institutional ‘capacity,’ rather than the fundamental problems with 
‘hierarchy’ as an accountability mechanism 
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Finally, we briefly consider the working of checks and balances as accountability 
mechanisms in the Indian case. These are not strictly hierarchical, but share the 
characteristic of being internal to the government. As we have indicated earlier, 
accountability of the executive to the national legislature has typically been weak (Kapur 
and Mehta, 2006).  The quality of parliamentary debate, in questioning levels of 
performance in meeting government responsibilities to citizens, is relatively poor. With 
some generalization, and ignoring variations across states, this is true of state-level 
legislatures as well.  In recent years, driven somewhat by public interest lawsuits, higher 
level courts (the Supreme Court and some state High Courts) have stepped in to enforce 
government performance, but this is more in the nature of an indirect external 
accountability mechanism, rather than a standard checks and balances mechanism. The 
latter would involve the judiciary restraining the powers of the other two branches, or 
acting as umpire between them, or between different levels of government. The courts 
have played this role in the past, with the Supreme Court called upon in several important 
cases (see, e.g., Rao and Singh, 2005, Chapter 3). In any case, judicial intervention, by its 
very nature, cannot be an effective mechanism for day-to-day internal accountability. 
 
 
2.2. Intergovernmental competition   
Before the economic reforms of the 1990s, state governments were severely 
constrained in terms of their economic policies.45 They could choose tax and expenditure 
policies according to their constitutional assignments, and within the further constraints 
imposed by central government policies that emphasized central planning and centralized 
direction of the allocation of resources.  Since private and public investment was largely 
directed by the central government, there was a minimal role for state governments to 
compete with each other for private sector capital flows. Instead, competition took place 
(and still does) for central government resources through the channels discussed earlier, 
in Section 1.5. State level policies were also influenced by intra-state competition for 
political power (e.g., Rao, 1979, 1981; Dutta, 2000). 
 
One long-standing aspect of inter-state competition that did pre-date economic 
reform was in the setting of sales tax rates. Adjacent states have sometimes set low tax 
rates on some goods to attract cross-border purchases from adjacent jurisdictions, and 
hence (assuming an appropriate elasticity of demand and adjacent market size) enhance 
sales tax revenue. There were several instances where automobiles and consumer 
electronics were taxed at the same or lower rates than food grains and edible oils, 
contrary to the objectives of equity which had originally motivated sales tax rate 
differentiation. In general, this kind of inter-state tax competition in India led to 
allocative inefficiencies, as well as distributional inequities (Rao and Vaillancourt, 1994). 
As part of a general overhaul of the sales tax system in India, including the introduction 
of a value added tax (VAT), there have been attempts to achieve some degree of tax 
                                                 
45 As will be clear from our earlier discussion, local governments remain severely circumscribed in the 
policies they can undertake to attract economic activity. Even large metropolitan areas are governed by 
state level policy in terms of land use, industrial development, and so on. In particular, significant urban 
land is typically controlled by state governments rather than municipal corporations. 
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harmonization, and control harmful tax competition (e.g., Rao and Rao, 2006; Singh and 
Srinivasan, 2006). One aspect of the indirect tax system and its reform that is important 
to mention here is the choice between an origin-based (the current) system and a 
destination-based one (as has been proposed for the VAT). While neither approach 
dominates in terms of welfare or efficiency (Oliveira, 2001), an origin-based system can 
distort producers’ location decisions, and this would be a greater consideration for 
managing inter-state tax competition in the future. 
 
The reforms of the 1990s generally gave state governments more freedom to 
make policies independently. In particular, states can now seek to affect the incentives of 
external capital to enter their jurisdictions. An early analysis by Bajpai and Sachs (1999, 
Appendices I through V) documented in summary form the policy measures taken by 
various states to attract external capital, particularly FDI.  The outlines of policy reforms 
appeared quite similar, but implementation, based on qualitative assessments, varied 
much more, suggesting that some states were much more successful in actually 
reforming. The dimensions of reform and policy incentives included industrial policy 
controls, tax and financing incentives, and land and infrastructure provision. In some 
cases, state governments were able to build on already attractive investment 
environments (Mumbai for Maharashtra and Bangalore for Karnataka), while in others, 
such as Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, government policy appears to have played a 
more pivotal role in attracting new investments. In some sectors, particularly information 
technology (IT) and IT-enabled services such as call centers and business process 
outsourcing, the central government also provided some assistance to state governments 
(e.g., for software technology parks, or STPs), but these were notionally uniform across 
states, so that successful implementation depended very much on state-level policies and 
actions. For example, Tamil Nadu’s STP in Chennai was an early success, whereas that 
of Punjab is only now being developed, with a lag of several years. 
 
The importance of policy was also suggested by the analysis of Singh and 
Srinivasan (2005a), who examined state wise data for total FDI approvals for the decade 
1991-2001 The simple correlation of per capita FDI approvals with a state-level 
infrastructure index was less than 0.1. This partly reflects the use of FDI approvals rather 
than actual investment, and the limitations of the infrastructure index.46 To the extent that 
variations in FDI across states were influenced by specific policy initiatives and narrowly 
focused government investments in infrastructure, such as might be the case in Andhra 
Pradesh, Karnataka or Tamil Nadu, there is scope for state governments to compete more 
effectively for FDI that might itself have a longer-term impact on infrastructure. For 
example, Punjab, with the highest index of infrastructure, lagged substantially in FDI, but 
appears to be changing this situation with recent policy adjustments.47   
 
Dollar, Iarossi and Mengistae (2002) were able to examine the quantitative impact 
of some dimensions of state-level variations in policy on manufacturing productivity. 
                                                 
46 For example, a state such as Karnataka is measured by such indices as having very low infrastructure 
development, despite its concentration of workers with high levels of technical skills. 
47 Singh (2007), based on interviews with entrepreneurs and government officials, found that in the early 
2000s, the policy environment in Punjab was quite inimical to new investment. 
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Using a survey of 1000 manufacturing establishments across 10 Indian states, they found 
that states that were poor performers, and identified by survey respondents as having a 
‘poor investment climate’, had total factor productivity (TFP) that was 26 percent lower 
than the high-performing states. About a tenth of this gap was found to be due to a higher 
regulatory burden (specifically, labor market regulations and their implementation) in the 
worse states.  
 
 
Figure 1: NCAER Incentives Index (1996) 
 
  
 
 
More general quantitative state-level analyses of the impacts of policy reform are 
not apparently available, though compilations of investment incentives and industrial 
policies across the states of India are available.48 Box 3 provides a specific state example. 
An early study (National Council of Applied Economic Research, 1997) constructed an 
index measuring the attractiveness of state incentive packages (Figure 1), but there does 
not appear to be an update of this exercise – in fact, states that scored well on this index 
continue to advertise the fact, omitting the date of the study.49 There are also rankings of 
states in terms of quality of life (Bhandari and Debroy, 2006) – important for attracting 
skilled workers,50 economic freedom (Debroy and Bhandari, 2005) – used as a measure 
of attractiveness for doing business, and overall competitiveness (National Productivity 
Council, 2004). The competitiveness measure included an index of governance quality, 
which, in turn, included measures of state policies with respect to business and 
investment. These various indices and rankings provide some indication of the degree to 
which state policies differ in practice, though they often capture exogenous factors along 
with endogenous policies. 
 
Given the divergence of economic performance of India’s states in the post-
reform era (e.g., Rao, Shand and Kalirajan, 1999; Ahluwalia, 2002; Rao and Singh, 2005; 
                                                 
48 A good example is at the web site “India in Business” (http://www.indiainbusiness.nic.in/invest-
india/State-govt-index.htm), compiled by the industry association, Federation of Indian Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry (FICCI), for the Ministry of External Affairs. 
49 See, for example, http://www.indiainbusiness.nic.in/indian-states/tamilnadu/IncenInves.htm. 
50 As would be expected in a surplus labor economy, there is little evidence that states or cities compete for 
less skilled workers through the provision of basic public amenities. While the highly skilled are very 
mobile, labor mobility in India is generally very low (Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2005).  
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Singh and Srinivasan, 2005a), it is plausible to assign some of the differences to state 
level policy variables. Differences in growth performance are explained by differences in 
private investment, public expenditure, and infrastructure quality, among other variables. 
State-level fixed effects in panel data studies are also significant, and can be interpreted 
as capturing unmeasured differences in institutions and policies. However, there has been 
no direct general empirical link established between state-level policies that aim to 
compete for external capital (both domestic and foreign) and resulting economic 
performance, with the Dollar, Iarossi and Mengistae (2002) study as a limited 
exception.51
 
 
 
Box 3: Gujarat Investment Incentives  
 
Incentives to industries 
 
1. Any small scale unit set up with its own investment can avail 10% limited to maximum Rs. 10 lakhs of 
the eligible fixed capital investment under interest subsidy or investment subsidy scheme - 2000. 
2. Any small scale unit set up with the loans from financial institution or any existing small scale unit 
going for modernization program can avail of 5% subsidy on the applicable interest over the loan 
period, limited to Rs. 5 lakhs per annum totaling to Rs. 25 lakhs. This subsidy is limited to 3% in case 
of expansion or diversification of the existing small scale unit limited to RS. 3 lakhs per annum 
totaling to Rs. 15 lakhs. 
3. In case of declared backward areas by the Government, the subsidy mentioned under (1) and (2) in 
increased by 25%. 
4. Any medium or large scale unit having incurred cost for creation of infrastructure can avail 25% 
subsidy limited to Rs. 100 lakhs under medium and large scale units subsidy scheme - 2000. The upper 
limit is extendable to Rs. 250 lakhs for schemes under rural linkage projects. 
5. Under New Industrial Policy - Assistance for Research and Development and Patent Registration 
scheme, assistance will be provided by the State Government on specific proposals on merits for 
activities related to research and development. Assistance will be provided at the rate of 50% limited to 
Rs. 5 lakhs for patent/ IPR. 
6. Any unit with minimum investment of Rs. 20 crores set up after 31st July 2001 till 31st July 2003 in 
Kutch district of Gujarat can avail of excise exemption benefit of maximum 5 years from the date of 
commencement of commercial production. 
7. Under Incentive scheme 2001 for Economic Development of Kutch District, any unit set up between 
31-7-2001 and 31-10-2004 can avail of sales tax exemption or sales tax deferment or composite 
scheme for units having capital investment exceeding Rs. 100 crores for a period of 5 years from the 
date of commencement of commercial production. 
8. 92 talukas of 21 districts are declared by the State Government as backward areas which are eligible 
for enhanced benefits under various schemes mentioned above  
 
Source: http://www.indiainbusiness.nic.in/indian-states/gujarat/investmentincentivesindex.htm 
 
 
 
It is also not clear to what extent inter-state competition has affected the states’ 
fiscal positions. As we shall argue in Section 3.1, other factors such as agricultural 
                                                 
51 There are also a few case studies of such competition, e.g., that between Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu 
for a Ford-Mahindra automobile production plant (Oman, 2000). In this case, Tamil Nadu won on the basis 
of infrastructure and skills availability, while incentives ranked only 7th in importance. 
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subsidies and large pay raises for government employees are most likely the dominant 
proximate causes of the states’ declining fiscal situations since the 1990s. The data 
suggest that increases in such expenditures have led to increasing deficits, rather than 
declining tax revenues, though the counterfactual in the latter case is a unit elasticity of 
state tax revenues with respect to GDP. The Twelfth Finance Commission report 
(Finance Commission, 2004, Chapter 6) uses normative marginal elasticities (“buoyancy 
ratios”) ranging from 1.1 to 1.35 for different states in making its projections. The 
difference between these prescriptive values and the data could be due to tax incentives 
provided by states to attract external capital, but is more likely due to overall poorly 
designed and implemented tax systems (Section 1.4 above) than to specific fiscal 
incentives for industry. For example, with sales tax revenue making up a little over 60 
percent of states’ own tax revenues in 2004-05 (RBI, 2006b, Appendix Table 3), it is 
unlikely that a 10 percent reduction in tax revenues (implied by a counterfactual 
buoyancy ratio of 1.1 instead of the observed unity) could have come from sales tax 
incentives alone. 
 
At the local level, as may have been clear from the discussion of local 
government powers and functioning in Section 1, there is little scope for explicit 
competition for economic activity. Mathew (2004) describes the situation as follows, 
“The role of local government is essentially distributive rather than productive. It is this 
anomaly of policy perception that still keeps panchayati raj institutions as an appendix to 
governance structures in the country.” This observation is particularly germane because 
local government competition as a spur to economic activity has been identified as an 
important ingredient in China’s rapid growth (e.g., Cao, Qian, and Weingast, 1999; Jin, 
Qian, and Weingast, 2005), which has become a benchmark for India’s economic 
performance. 
 
In concluding this section, we can summarize as follows. It is clear that, since 
economic reform began, state governments have quite aggressively pursued policies to 
attract external capital. However, the efficacy of these policies, their economic impacts, 
and the consequences for state government budgets remain uncertain, especially with 
respect to any quantitative assessment. It is also not clear to what extent competition 
among nearby states has cancelled out incentives, in an inefficient non-cooperative 
equilibrium of state policies. Broader empirical work (Lall and Chakravorty, 2003) and 
anecdotal evidence in the media do suggest that industrial location in India is sensitive to 
a variety of economic factors, and the quality of governance appears to matter in this 
reading of the evidence (National Productivity Council, 2004), more than specific 
tax/subsidy incentives. 
 
 
2.3. Credit markets 
Traditionally, state borrowing through bond issuance has been heavily controlled. 
The process has been managed by the RBI, and the bond issues placed with banks and 
other financial institutions at administered interest rates, typically the same for all 
borrowers. Hence, the issue of testing creditworthiness of state bonds in the market has 
not arisen in the past. As discussed in Section 1.6, there are now concrete proposals and 
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steps being taken to shift the states toward true market borrowing, with independent 
credit ratings and interest rates determined by supply and demand.  
 
The central government itself made the shift to market-determined interest rates 
for its borrowing relatively recently, and the market for central government bonds is in its 
infancy. There are few dealers who are eligible to participate in primary auctions, the 
secondary market is thin, and the RBI maintains restrictions on short selling, futures and 
other derivatives. In fact, the corporate bond market is also underdeveloped in India, with 
corporate and other private sector bonds (e.g., those of development finance institutions, 
or DFIs) representing a small percentage of the total market capitalization (Patil, 2001). 
The newness of the market, and restrictions on instruments that might allow better risk 
management in the face of the uncertainty associated with novelty, work against a rapid 
development of the bond market. Banks, which hold government bonds in excess of 
statutory requirements, are also reluctant traders in the bond market. The domestic credit 
agencies (CRISIL, CARE and ICRA) do not assign (directly) ratings to central or state 
government bonds.52 Instead, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s provide overall sovereign 
debt ratings for India,53 as they have done in the past. 
 
The development of domestic credit ratings for government debt has therefore 
begun with state-level public enterprises, municipal corporations and special purpose 
vehicles at the state and municipal levels. There is a variety of financing approaches 
taken, with some cases introducing a minimum of market involvement, relying on partial 
funding from higher level governments, multilaterals or other financial intermediaries, 
and various guarantees. In other cases, there has been direct sale of bonds to the public as 
well as financial institutions, without any guarantees.54 Since the first municipal bond 
issue was only in 1998, and most issues have been much more recent, there is little 
history or experience to judge the long-term performance of the market as a monitoring 
and disciplining mechanism for these bond issues. One of the main issues remains the 
development of state and local government capacity to formulate projects and associated 
capital issues to meet market tests. Nevertheless, there are some positive initial 
developments, in terms of design of financing, managing risks, and involvement of 
beneficiaries (e.g., the Tamil Nadu Urban Development Fund).  
 
As noted in Section 1.6, the domestic credit rating agencies all provide ratings for 
the various bond issues at the municipal and state-enterprise level. These ratings are 
determined on standard criteria (see, e.g., Box 2), having to do with the borrower’s 
capabilities and performance. International experience has led to well-recognized 
guidelines for assessing credit risks (Peterson, 1998). In this context, the weak revenue 
authority of local governments, as well as poor revenue collection practices (see Section 
                                                 
52 The domestic rating agencies offer ratings of bonds issued by state government agencies for specific 
projects or ongoing investment in particular sectors – since these bonds are backed by the relevant state 
governments, their rating effectively involves an explicit assessment of the state government finances. 
53 CRISIL partners with Standard & Poor’s, CARE with Fitch, and ICRA with Moody’s. 
54 Numerous studies survey the Indian experience at the local government level, though often covering the 
same few examples. See, in particular, Bagchi and Kundu (2003); World Bank (2004a); Venkatachalam 
(2005); Pradhan (2003). 
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1.4 above) would act as significant barriers to positive assessments of credit risks for 
most urban local bodies in India. Some analyses of ratings methodology and practice in 
the Indian context (e.g., Kundu, 2001) express concerns with ratings implementation. The 
argument is that local government accounts are not reliable enough for accurate ratings. 
Indeed, it is suggested that local governments under pressure to raise funds from the 
market may distort their accounting. This is not an argument against market borrowing or 
credit rating, but does illustrate the difficulties of creating a new institutional 
infrastructure. Again, the importance of prior reform in budgetary practices is 
highlighted, as a pre-condition for a successful market for subnational debt.55 Another 
issue that has been raised concerns political influence on credit ratings. Ultimately, the 
credit ratings agencies themselves will have to maintain reputation, and the existence of 
competition among them should ameliorate early concerns or problems with the quality 
and objectivity of credit ratings. 
 
Finally, there is little evidence that credit ratings have an ongoing effect on 
municipal finance in India. Again, the market is too thin and too new for there to be any 
real experience or history. Credit ratings are typically only long term, and do not appear 
to be adjusted with any great frequency, though this might be expected since the handful 
of financed projects are too new or recent to be capable of meaningful reassessment. In 
general, one can argue that the proper sequence of development might be national bond 
markets, then development of state and local project assessment and management, and 
revenue capacity, with a full-fledged market for subnational borrowing following on 
these broader and more fundamental reforms. 
 
 
2.4. Democratic channels    
Theoretical models of the democratic political process typically assume some 
kind of electoral responsiveness (e.g., Downs, 1957), driven by politicians’ preferences 
for re-election. This responsiveness may be to individual voter preferences (sometimes 
ordered or aggregated in a way that makes elected officials responsive to the median 
voter), or to groups of voters, i.e., interest groups. In the latter case, lobbying or political 
pressure by well-endowed groups can lead to biased outcomes. Democratic 
responsiveness may also be altered when candidates have their own ideologies or 
preferences, and do not merely carry out voters’ wishes (Lipset, 1960; Wittman, 1973). 
Different assumptions about politicians’ objectives, the electoral process and the 
distribution of voter preferences and resources lead to varying predictions about the 
outcomes of democracy. In a federal system, a further issue concerns the locus of policies 
that are determined by elected officials. Since voters, in choosing elected representatives, 
are implicitly choosing among bundles of policies, decentralization can allow incentives 
working through the democratic process to be more refined. Alternatively, centralization 
may allow better policy coordination (Seabright, 1996; Rao and Singh, 2003). Finally, 
another dimension of political competition occurs when legislative coalitions must be 
formed after elections: policies may be determined by the need to maintain such 
coalitions.  
                                                 
55 See the studies in Morris (2003), Section 8, for examples of budgeting practices and budget reform at the 
municipal level. 
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At the national level, the process of organizational decay and reduced political 
influence of the once-dominant Indian National Congress, coupled with the rise of the 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) as a national “right-wing” party, and the emergence of 
regional and caste-based parties, has been touched on in Section 1.1, and extensively 
analyzed elsewhere (e.g., Rudolph and Rudolph, 1987; Brass, 1994; and Kohli 1990). 
Even in the past situation of a strong national party, the need to mobilize electoral support 
at the state level influenced national policies, but this became more important with 
greater national electoral competition. In the 1960s, the communist party emerged as a 
regional force in Kerala and West Bengal, while Tamil Nadu saw the first example of 
dominance by avowedly regional parties.  
 
Chhibber (1995) explains the deepening of ‘rent-seeking’ – including the 
persistence of the laws that make it possible – in terms of the intensifying needs of 
political competition. Essentially, powers of patronage for electoral support became more 
important in the 1970s and 1980s, overwhelming any concerns about the inefficiency of 
the system from the perspective of economic growth. Chhibber provides empirical 
evidence that central loans, food assistance and subsidies to the states were all linked to 
electoral considerations. Similarly, Rao and Singh (2005), Kapur and Mehta (2002), and 
others have argued that large payments were directed by the center in the late 1990s to 
the states (Andhra Pradesh and Punjab) from which regional parties that were key 
coalition partners originated. In this case, the political support mechanism was more 
direct, the objective being to build a majority coalition in parliament after elections, 
whereas in Chhibber’s analysis it derived from the pre-election need to mobilize state-
level political resources for national elections. Rodden and Wilkinson (2004) find 
empirical support for the proposition that distributive politics in India changed in the 
1990s as a result of the shift from single party dominance to coalition governments. 
 
Many other studies examine the impact of central government transfers on state-
level policy choices, and mostly find evidence of political motivations in some transfer 
channels (e.g., Biswas and Marjit, 2000; Rao and Singh, 2002; Das-Gupta, Dhillon and 
Dutta, 2004; Khemani, 2004, 2006a,b; Purfield, 2003; Singh and Vasishtha, 2004). Thus, 
the evidence suggests that the central government tries to influence voters at the state 
level through this indirect mechanism. One complicating factor for these studies that has 
emerged over time is the de-linking of national and state-level elections, which now 
typically occur at different times, rather than simultaneously, as was the case in the first 
two decades after Indian independence. On the other hand, Khemani (2001) looking at 
both national and state elections, finds evidence that voters reward (punish) governments 
for good (poor) economic performance, but do so more vigilantly at the state versus the 
national level. This result is consistent with recent survey evidence, which indicates 
voters look primarily to state governments for provision of many important public goods 
(Chhibber, Shastri and Sisson, 2004). 
 
Focusing exclusively at the subnational level, Rao’s (1979, 1981) pioneering 
study of four states found that political competition factors affected tax and expenditure 
patterns. Dutta (1996, 2000) found that states with unstable coalition governments tended 
 36
PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE OR CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION 
to spend more and raise less non-tax revenue. Note that these studies at the national and 
subnational levels tended to focus on expenditures, rather than outcomes. In fact, much of 
this expenditure took the form of various implicit and explicit subsidies, for agricultural 
inputs and outputs, and for employment, rather than pure public goods. Thus the link 
between electoral competition and actual delivery of public goods was not as well-
established. However, media accounts of recent elections have suggested that voters 
increasingly expect improvements in areas such as water, electric power and roads, and 
punish incumbent state governments for failures in these domains by switching to 
opposition parties. Other studies at the subnational level also suggest that both social 
conditions (Banerjee and Somanathan, 2001, 2006; Kochar, K. Singh and S. Singh, 2006) 
and political institutions such as reservations for scheduled castes and tribes (Pande, 
2003) affect the allocation of public goods: these studies indicate the limits of pure 
electoral competition in determining outcomes. 
 
 Much of the recent work on electoral accountability has focused at the local level, 
where the measurement of local public good delivery can also potentially be more 
precise, through geographically concentrated survey data. As noted earlier, regular direct 
local elections have the potential to increase the accountability of local government by 
providing more direct and refined incentives to please constituents. The counter argument 
is that interest groups or powerful individuals will instead have more influence at the 
local level.56 In fact, concerns about elite domination of elected rural local bodies, have 
existed since independence, and heavily influenced India’s federal design. 
 
Early, pre-reform qualitative studies of local government found examples of 
interest group capture, as well as positive impacts of local democratic processes. For 
example, Dash (1988, p. 223) gave examples of the Puri Municipal Council in Orissa 
providing reductions in, or exemptions from octroi taxes to specific commercial products, 
benefiting local interest groups. Many case studies mention or imply the reluctance of 
local governments to impose taxes, being responsive to their constituents in this respect 
(e.g., Aziz, 1998). More recently, Jha, Rao and Woolcock (2005) found that while formal 
government channels in a Delhi slum were accessible mainly to the well-off, informal 
governance structures arose at the community or neighborhood level, which then 
provided more general access to public services through their leaders’ links to elected 
politicians in the municipal council or legislative assembly. 
 
On the positive side, with respect to elite domination, as long ago as 1965, Andre 
Béteille observed, in his study of a rural area of Tamil Nadu, “Adult franchise and 
Panchayati Raj have introduced new processes into village society” (p. 221), and 
“political and legislative changes have altered the bargaining positions of the old 
economic classes” (p. 223), arguing that local elections increased the power of those who 
were worse off but were in greater numbers, rather than perpetuating or increasing 
                                                 
56 Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000) provided an early analysis of the problem of “local capture,” while 
Banerjee and Somanathan (2001, 2006) found that local heterogeneity distorted the pattern of delivery of 
public services. Kochar, K. Singh and S. Singh provide a more micro level analysis that captures 
institutional features of rural spending, and helps explain some of these results in more depth. See Keefer 
and Khemani (2003, 2005) for an overview of some of this literature, and related issues. 
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domination by the traditional rural elite.  Another example is urban.  While the Shiv Sena 
is better known for other aspects of its ideology, its success as a political organization 
was also built on its attention to ward and municipal constituencies in Mumbai: it 
achieved electoral rewards by being responsive to those near the bottom of the economic 
ladder (Naipaul, 1975). 
 
Local government reforms have spurred data collection and research on the 
impacts of new institutions for ‘voice’ in India. Studies of South India (Chaudhuri and 
Heller, 2003; Besley, Pande and Rao, 2006b) suggest that participation in village 
assemblies (gram sabhas) is driven by self-interest, as well as affected by factors that can 
be changed through policy interventions. Thus, participation in this new avenue of direct 
democracy has been encouraging, despite initial concerns about its efficacy. More 
significantly, there is evidence that local electoral participation is beginning to influence 
outcomes. Chaudhuri (2005) found that decentralized resource allocation in Kerala did 
improve perceived delivery of roads, housing and child development services, with the 
decentralization involving devolution of budgetary authority to elected rural local 
governments. Besley, Pande and Rao (2006a, b) and Besley, Pande, Rahman and Rao 
(2006) for southern India, and Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006a,b) for West Bengal in 
eastern India also find evidence that electoral competition affects the nature and pattern 
of allocation of local public goods and services. Again, all these studies find evidence 
that initial social conditions such as education and caste, as well as the precise structure 
of political institutions matter for outcomes (e.g., Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004 for seat 
reservations at the local level). These may be necessary and acceptable limits on the 
efficacy of the political process. While we cannot precisely compare outcomes of state 
and local electoral accountability, it appears that the experience of decentralization to the 
local level in India has had some positive outcomes, and has not been subject to extremes 
of local capture. Subnational corruption and capture, as well as less extreme cases of 
interest group influence, are discussed in more detail in Section 3.3. 
 
One final point is that positive results on local electoral responsiveness are 
emerging even though the institutional structures are generally far from supportive. 
Besides the lack of independent revenue authority, local governments are still potentially 
subject to control and interference from state-level bureaucrats and politicians over their 
entire domain of expenditure authority. Furthermore, local governments are often 
restricted in key areas such as land use, where state governments retain control.  
 
 
3. Analysis of Implications 
In reviewing India’s institutions of intergovernmental relations (fiscal and 
otherwise), and the accountability mechanisms that function within those institutions, we 
have commented at several points on problems of performance or effectiveness. This 
section examines three aspects of outcomes more explicitly. First, it reviews the situation 
with respect to fiscal deficits, and attempts to control burgeoning deficits at national and 
subnational levels. Second, the quality of service delivery is examined, particularly with 
respect to the impact of decentralization. Third, issues of corruption and capture with 
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respect to different levels of governance are examined. Again, the impact of 
decentralization is the major focus. 
 
 
3.1. Fiscal discipline 
India has struggled with fiscal discipline for over fifteen years. India’s fiscal 
situation began to deteriorate in the late 1980s, at the central and state levels. The crisis of 
1991 led to a tightening, but fiscal deficits began to rise in 1997-98 at both levels of 
government, though the rise was much greater at the state level (Table 11). Fiscal 
balances at both levels were severely affected by the large pay increases granted to 
central government employees in 1997-98, by the Fifth Pay Commission, followed by 
similar increases at the state level the following year.57 The center’s balance continued to 
deteriorate slowly till 2001-02, when the trend was reversed.  The states’ aggregate 
position stabilized after the one-time shock, and improved after 2002-03. Two other fiscal 
indicators also deteriorated after 1997-98. The revenue deficit (i.e., balance between 
current receipts and expenditures) grew as a percentage of GDP, coming down to 1997-
98 levels only in 2004-05. The primary deficit (after taking out net interest payments 
from expenditures) has grown, after the initial reduction in the early 1990s, indicating 
that the problem is not simply growing interest payments, though these have also gone up 
as a percentage of GDP. Fiscal deficits financed by borrowing have added to the 
government debt (Table 12). After some decline in the early 1990s, the stock of 
government debt rose steadily after 1997-98, as a percentage of GDP, before stabilizing 
from 2002-03. A significant portion of this increase was at the state level. For example, 
the debt-GDP ratio of the states increased from 21 percent in 1996-97 to 31 percent in 
2002-03. 
 
In addition to the stabilization or slight improvement in the center’s and states’ 
main fiscal indicators, government guarantees have also been controlled, falling from 
12.2 percent of GDP in 2001 to 9.9 percent in 2005, though the latter figure is provisional 
(RBI, 2006, Table 1.36). The external debt is also under control (16 percent of GNP in 
March 200658 – which is classified as low by international standards), and foreign 
reserves are at very comfortable levels ($162.9 billion in June 2006). On the other hand, 
the future cost of the pension system remains a serious issue for the medium and long 
run. The World Bank estimates that the cash-flow deficit of the Employees’ Pension 
Scheme (EPS), which is a defined benefit scheme, will grow to almost 1 percent of GDP 
over the next few decades, even without increases in coverage.  
 
Looking at the states in more detail, they had nonexistent or negligible revenue 
deficits before the late 1980s, but in aggregate have always been in revenue deficit from 
1987-88 onward.  Their aggregate revenue deficit increased from an average of 0.62 
                                                 
57 These increases at the state level were certainly not mandated, but appear to have been driven by a kind 
of social norm regarding the relative pay of central and state-level bureaucrats. The fact that key central 
bureaucrats (e.g., from the IAS and IPS) serve at the state level would make such comparisons salient. 
58 This figure is from a Ministry of Finance Press release, August 2006, accessed on December 13, 2006 at 
http://finmin.nic.in/press_room/2006/PressDebtRep06E.pdf 
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percent of GDP across 1993-96 to 2.53 percent in 2000-03.59 This deterioration was 
greater than the worsening in overall fiscal deficits for the same period (2.55 percent to 
4.07 percent), reflecting the crowding out of capital expenditures by current expenditures 
such as subsides and salary payments. The spillover from the pay commission’s award 
led to a very large jump in the states’ wage bills, and liquidity problems for state 
governments, which even had difficulty in paying those bills (World Bank, 2005, Box 
1.1). The states’ total primary deficit also worsened significantly, from an average of 0.69 
percent of GDP over 1993-96 to 1.41 percent over 2000-03. The latest estimates for the 
revenue deficit (1.4 percent in 2004-05 and budgeted at 0.7 percent in 2005-06) reflect an 
improvement, but it is too early to confidently identify a trend.60 Disaggregating the 
states’ deficits reveals (Table 13) that the source of deterioration has been increases in 
expenditures such as interest payments, rather than declines in own revenues or transfers 
from the central government (particularly tax sharing and grants determined by the 
Finance Commission). Further aspects of changes in expenditure (not shown in Table 13) 
have been increases in subsidies – with the power sector a major culprit – and a squeeze 
on Plan expenditure, which ought to be earmarked for capital projects. Some of the 
negative impact of the power sector’s problems also shows up in the decline in net non-
tax revenues (Table 13 and Rao, 2004). 
 
The fiscal performance of individual states has varied considerably. In many 
cases, the fiscal deterioration for the special category states was worse than that of the 
major states, but we focus on the latter here, as they contain the bulk of India’s 
population. Data for 15 general category states is shown in Table 14.61 Ranks are shown 
in parentheses, with a higher rank indicating a ‘worse’ number in terms of deficit, change 
in deficit, or debt stock. There is no clear pattern across states in fiscal positions or level 
of deterioration. High and low income states, reforming states as well as those that have 
moved slowly on reform, larger and smaller states, all have shown significant fiscal 
deterioration. The correlation between revenue deficits in the earlier and later periods was 
0.35, and the correlation between the revenue deficits in the earlier period and their 
changes was in fact negative (-0.37). The corresponding correlations for fiscal deficits 
were 0.67 and –0.11. The 2004-05 figures, in the last column of the Table, suggest that 
                                                 
59 These and other figures in this section are taken from the report of the Twelfth Finance Commission 
(Twelfth Finance Commission, 2004). The discussion here draws heavily on Singh (2006). 
60 These figures are from the Economic Survey of India, 2005-06, available at 
http://indiabudget.nic.in/es2005-06/chapt2006/chap29.pdf. The improvement in the fiscal deficit, 4.0% in 
2004-05 and 3.4% in 2005-06 has been smaller, and the debt-GDP ratio has climbed to 33%, though it may 
stabilize soon. 
61 Following the analysis in the Twelfth Finance Commission Report, the new states of Chhattisgarh, 
Jharkand and Uttaranchal are combined with their respective ‘parents’ for the purposes of the comparison 
across the years. The 2004-05 figures do not include these new states within Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and 
Uttar Pradesh, so are not strictly comparable. See the note to Table 14. 
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this superficial lack of pattern in fiscal performance continued,62 though some analyses 
suggest that deficits have been correlated with political variables (Khemani, 2006b).63
 
Table 15 does indicate some of the underlying sources of states’ differing 
performance. Table 15 again ranks from ‘worst’ to ‘best’, with ‘worst’ being low tax 
revenue or revenue increases, but high expenditure or expenditure increases. This 
characterization neglects the potential benefits of government expenditure,64 focusing 
only on the narrow fiscal consequences. Bearing out the earlier aggregate figures (Table 
13), we see that, while a couple of states have allowed own-tax revenues to slip 
substantially, the major source of fiscal deterioration has been increases in expenditures 
running well beyond tax revenues. The correlation between the own-tax and expenditure 
ratios fell from -0.13 in the earlier period to -0.41 in the later period, with the negative 
coefficients indicating, perhaps surprisingly, that higher spending states tended to do 
worse in own revenue-raising. Again, there is no obvious or simple link between the 
economic characteristics of the states and their relative revenue and expenditure 
performance. However, we can consider various institutional contributors to the states’ 
current situation. 
 
Institutional responses to the severe deterioration of the states’ fiscal positions 
were described in Section 1.2, in the context of formal institutional changes in budgetary 
autonomy. The earlier reliance on internal hierarchical controls through political parties 
and the bureaucracy was no longer effective. The RBI has continued to be a major 
institutional player in enforcing fiscal discipline, but with new constraints on its role, as 
state governments have exercised greater freedom in policymaking and spending. Initial 
attempts by the center to impose fiscal discipline ran into problems of credibility. These 
included “contracts,” in the nature of MOUs, with fiscal reforms to be exchanged for 
ways and means advances on transfers due to the states, and a portion of central-state 
transfers being made conditional on fiscal reforms.  
 
The latest approach to institutional reform seems to have worked better in moving 
toward fiscal discipline, by commitment to explicit targets for deficit reduction through 
fiscal responsibility legislation. The central government and many state governments 
have passed such legislation.  The Twelfth Finance Commission recommended pushing 
the remaining states toward this commitment by tying debt relief to their passage and 
implementation of fiscal responsibility laws. The commission even recommended 
minimum provisions for state level legislation.65 Preliminary analyses of the impact of 
                                                 
62 Budget estimates for 2005-06 indicate significant fiscal improvement for Maharashtra and Gujarat, and 
somewhat for Madhya Pradesh and Orissa, but not for other states. In fact, Andhra Pradesh, Haryana and 
West Bengal project large increases in fiscal deficits (RBI, 2006, Table VII). This further illustrates the 
unpredictability of states’ deficits from year to year, in terms of any simple observable characteristic. 
63 See also Purfield (2003) for a different regression analysis approach that looks at contagion from the 
center and various structural variables. In general, the variation in the data suggests that further analysis is 
required to reach any robust conclusions. 
64 In fact, as pointed out in the Twelfth Finance Commission Report, revenue expenditure has tended to 
crowd out capital expenditure, suggesting that the quality of expenditure has declined over this period. 
65 The commission developed an elaborate scheme for restructuring the states’ existing debt. Writing off 
debt and/or rescheduling it does create moral hazard –blunting incentives to change the behavior that led to 
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such laws suggest that they have had positive impacts on states’ fiscal positions, though 
both the early passage of legislation and positive fiscal outcomes may be joint outcomes 
of political consensus in those states. In any case, fiscal responsibility laws promote 
greater transparency and easier monitoring, though the latter may still require new 
institutional arrangements (Section 1.2 gives some options). Expenditure on salaries, 
which we have identified as a major contributor to growing fiscal deficits, has also been 
constrained by the new fiscal responsibility laws.  
 
Despite the usefulness of fiscal responsibility laws, they do not tackle the 
fundamental underlying incentive problems that can lead to poor fiscal decision-making 
by subnational governments: for example, their effectiveness would rely on states not 
being bailed out by the center. Therefore, the proposals to move state governments 
toward a market-disciplined borrowing regime, as discussed in Section 1.6, will be 
crucial for long run fiscal discipline. Even here, bailouts by the center remain a 
possibility, but they will be more transparent, and have more serious reputational 
consequences. The Finance Commission has recommended overall limits on borrowing 
by each state, and if these can be enforced effectively (by limiting off-budget borrowing 
in particular), they will help achieve fiscal discipline. Areas that remain relatively 
untouched, in legislation and recommendations implemented so far, are the use of captive 
financing such as small savings and pension funds, and the incentive problems built into 
the current center-state transfer system. 
 
With respect to local government finances, review of pre-reform data and case 
studies (Rao and Singh, 2003) indicates that local governments, particularly urban bodies, 
already faced significant fiscal problems by the 1980s, even before such problems 
became apparent at the state level, and well before local government reforms. 
Contributing factors were the lack of transparency, soft budget constraints due to the 
discretionary nature of local financing, rapid urbanization, and poor budgetary practices. 
One early view of local government reform (World Bank, 1995) was that formal transfers 
from the center and states to local governments could accentuate the states’ fiscal deficit 
problems. In fact, one can argue that introducing a formal, rule-governed system has 
made long-standing local fiscal problems more transparent, and therefore more easily 
identifiable and soluble.  In addition, creditors prefer rule-based to ad hoc transfers, and 
the long-term goal of building credit markets will be served by these reforms.66 While the 
current situation with respect to local governments seems no worse than the previous one 
of ad hoc and discretionary transfers and control of local bodies by state governments, 
the local government fiscal situation remains unsatisfactory in many ways (Sections 1.2 
through 1.6), and institutional reforms are still required in several dimensions. 
Differences in the fiscal situations of the states and local bodies include greater variations 
across states in local deficits and financing (as noted in Section 1.5, some local 
                                                                                                                                                 
the accumulation of debt in the first place. Conditionalities on debt relief, if credible, can alleviate such 
moral hazard.  However, the commission’s specific conditionalities may be too complex, and are 
potentially inconsistent in places (Rajaraman, 2005). There are also related questions about enforceability. 
In particular, the poorest highly indebted states may face deficit and debt situations that can only be 
realistically dealt with by specifically targeted debt relief, beyond what is currently recommended. 
 
66 I am grateful to Jonathan Rodden for this point. 
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governments are unable to spend all their budgets, due to institutional constraints), 
greater variations in per capita expenditures for local governments, and non-
standardization of accounting procedures. The latter makes it difficult, if not impossible, 
to perform a detailed state-by-state accounting of local government fiscal situations 
comparable to that in Tables 14 and 15. However, Table 16 provides a summary of the 
local government fiscal situation. 
 
 
3.2. Service delivery 
 Service delivery is poor at all levels of government in India. The problem is more 
acute at the subnational level because day-to-day and basic services – such as health care, 
education, water and sanitation – are more the responsibility of subnational tiers, while at 
the same time these tiers of government have been disadvantaged with respect to fiscal 
and administrative capacity. Increases in patronage politics and rent-seeking over time 
have resulted in a decline in the quality of public expenditure. Arguably, those with the 
greatest distance (social, political or geographical) from the locus of decision-making 
suffer the most, which suggests that reduction of this distance may be a beneficial 
direction of reform. 
 
There are several kinds of evidence for the poor quality of service delivery, 
including tangible public goods and services, as well as various forms of social insurance. 
One is simply measurement of performance and outcomes, such as educational 
attainment. A second is evidence based on inputs and processes of government, such as 
overall spending patterns, and teacher absenteeism. A third is the response of citizens, 
through exit from the system by use of private alternatives, and their voting behavior. 
 
 Measures of state level human development performance provide a first-level 
indicator of inefficiency, as measured by outcomes, since better-performing states 
provide a standard against which others can be judged. Table 17 summarizes the 
outcomes of India’s 14 major states in terms of a Human Development Index (HDI) 
constructed by the Planning Commission (2002). The HDI incorporates eight different 
dimensions of development performance: per capita expenditure, headcount poverty rate, 
literacy rate, a formal education enrollment index, infant mortality rate, life expectancy, 
access to safe water and access to housing constructed with relatively permanent 
materials. The variation in the HDI across states is not increasing over time, but neither is 
it the case that gaps are narrowing (Singh et al, 2003). Thus, the 2001 HDI for Gujarat, a 
high income state, is lower than the 1981 HDI for Kerala. In fact, changes in the HDI for 
the two states are comparable in absolute terms (though slightly lower as percentages for 
Kerala), while state government expenditure per capita in Gujarat is almost 40 percent 
higher. This pairwise comparison is merely one illustration of the relative failure of state 
governments to deliver on the kinds of public goods and services that affect the HDI. 
Long run district-level analyses (e.g., Banerjee and Iyer, 2004; Banerjee, Iyer and 
Somanathan, 2004; Banerjee and Somanathan, 2006 – the period covered in these cases is 
one where the state governments were primarily responsible for delivery) also show 
considerable variation in the nature and levels of public goods provided. The main 
conclusions from these studies are perhaps about political economy and the impact of 
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initial conditions, but the variation in outcomes is again a possible indicator of 
inefficiency in service delivery.  
 
Another performance indicator of inefficiency is the performance of state-level 
public enterprises, with the State Electricity Boards standing out in this respect. Their 
large financial losses, while partly the result of poor pricing policies, are strongly 
indicative of inefficient operations. Finally, poor targeting of expenditures is another 
indicator of inefficient service delivery. For example, a World Bank (2003a) study 
concludes that, “The burden of weak administration falls particularly on the poor, who 
suffer from skewed government spending, limited access to services, and employee 
indifference.” 
 
Second, studies of the functioning of government in India suggest pervasive 
examples of inefficiency in processes of public service delivery, including the 
functioning of core administrations, plan and ministry projects, and public sector 
enterprises. The evidence indicates that for many of the states, subsidies67 and salaries are 
taking a larger and larger share of expenditure, though the states’ performance in this 
respect is not uniform (e.g., Howes and Murgai, 2005) – some state administrations are 
more efficient than others. There is also evidence that public sector enterprises are also 
grossly over-staffed. While public sector employees currently enjoy monetary rents or 
leisure, at least some of the leisure in such inefficient organizations is involuntary, and 
results in frustration rather than any utility gain. Areas in which administration can be 
improved include budgeting procedures, accounting and auditing methods, personnel 
policies and tax collection, among others (Section 1 above; Finance Commission, 2004; 
World Bank, 2005).  
 
The low efficiency of delivery of health and education in rural areas because of 
poor performance (absenteeism and low effort) by government employees is also well 
documented (e.g., Drèze and Gazdar, 1996; PROBE, 1999; World Bank, 2003a, Chapter 
3; World Bank, 2006a; Howes and Murgai, 2005; Chaudhury et al, 2006; Kremer et al, 
2005). There is substantial evidence that institutional innovations that correct frontline 
provider incentives or modify the conditions of provision can improve efficiency (e.g., 
Banerjee et al, 2006; Duflo and Hanna, 2005). There is also evidence is that 
decentralization of accountability systems can improve incentives if implemented 
effectively, as in the Madhya Pradesh Education Guarantee Scheme (e.g., Sharma and 
Gopalakrishnan, 2001; Manor, 2004). Governmental decentralization in this manner is 
not exclusive of community, private or NGO participation.  
 
The third indicator of inefficiency in public service delivery is private or self-
provision.68 This may be natural and acceptable if there are income effects (e.g., private 
                                                 
67 In this context, it has been noted that a system of explicit user charges often allows for more efficient as 
well as more equitable delivery of services (e.g., drinking water, health and education: see World Bank, 
2003a, Chapter 3, as well as World Bank, 2005). This would clearly be a necessary part of a program of 
reducing inefficient and poorly targeted subsidies. 
68 Note that this phenomenon is totally distinct from deliberate public use of private contractors for service 
delivery or infrastructure provision or maintenance. An excellent treatment of the issues and alternatives in 
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vs. public transportation) associated with quality of service. Thus, the rich may always 
choose this route for many quasi-public goods. However, the Indian case is one where the 
middle class and even the poor rely on costly and inefficient methods69 of private 
provision, because public service delivery is so poor in quality. Household-level 
generation and storage of electric power and private purchase of water from tankers are 
two pervasive examples in India. The latter, in particular is often the only route available 
to the poor for household water supplies. 
 
  Poor quality and inefficient delivery of public services in India can, somewhat 
straightforwardly, be traced to the weak accountability mechanisms operating for 
individuals (politicians and government employees) and for organizations (ministries and 
various public sector enterprises). These issues were discussed in Section 2 of this paper. 
Some of the reforms that can improve service delivery involve strengthening 
accountability at each level of government, through internal reorganization for better 
incentive provision, and through greater transparency and more effective monitoring. 
Weaknesses in accountability can also be traced to the nature of expenditure and revenue 
assignments across levels of government. 
 
In some respects, all subnational governments in India, state and local, have 
revenue authority that is weaker than would be dictated by considerations of efficiency or 
equity. As a result, they rely heavily on transfers from higher level governments.  These 
transfers can be uncertain, and restricted in ways that make their effective use difficult.  
India’s subnational governments, especially at the local level, have problems in (1) 
exercising statutory authority, (2) administering taxes, and (3) establishing clear tax 
assignments.  The first problem arises partly because of inefficiencies in provision, 
creating a chicken-and-egg puzzle for improving service delivery. There are also two 
categories of problems with respect to subnational assignments of expenditure 
responsibilities (again, particularly at the local level): (1) excessive narrowness,70 and (2) 
lack of clarity.  With respect to the latter, concurrency in assignments is a pervasive 
feature of Indian federalism, and has created problems at all levels of government.  
Statutory decentralization of responsibilities and authority has not been matched by de 
facto decision-making control, with decisions often being made by higher-level 
bureaucrats and politicians.     
 
 If the above diagnosis is accurate, then there should be empirical evidence linking 
decentralization to better public service delivery. The problem in reaching general 
conclusions in this respect is that decentralization has been varied in its implementation, 
and by no means optimally designed. Nevertheless, there are some examples to suggest 
that giving subnational governments more leeway has led to some improvements in 
service delivery (as well as problems, as in the case of salaries, subsidies and overall 
                                                                                                                                                 
this context for urban water, roads and sanitation is in Deb (1996), Chapter 7. See also Morris (2002), 
Section 4.3. 
69 The inefficiencies include both the failure to capture scale economies, and negative externalities. 
Household level water and electric power production exhibit both these problems. 
70 An important, often-neglected aspect of assignment has to do with enforceability (World Bank, 2005), 
which requires an effective local judiciary. See Rao and Singh (2003) for further discussion. 
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fiscal discipline). At the state government level, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and 
Karnataka have made some efforts to improve public infrastructure that would 
complement and attract private business investment in sectors such as information 
technology. One can argue that these policies have not provided broad-based service 
delivery improvements, and certainly not for rural populations in those states. In some 
cases, the pace of economic development has outstripped the capacity of state and local 
governments to provide the necessary infrastructure. Nevertheless, one can make the case 
that mindsets and policymaking processes at the state level have undergone changes that 
move toward better satisfying constituents. Less controversial cases are those of Madhya 
Pradesh and Rajasthan, which seemed to have used greater policy-making discretion in 
the 1990s to improve social outcomes. Thus both of these states showed relative gains in 
their HDIs in the last decade or two (Table 17). 
 
 The evidence is more direct, and somewhat easier to interpret at the local level, 
since household survey data has been gathered to measure local government performance 
in several dimensions. While there is no study that performs an explicit “before-and-
after” exercise with respect to local government reform, evidence of local responsiveness, 
targeting and service delivery can be taken as being in favor of decentralization. Perhaps 
the closest to a “before-and-after” analysis is that of Chaudhuri (2005), who examined a 
significant exercise to decentralize decision-making beyond legislated assignments. This 
took place in the state of Kerala, which has a history of decentralization, and scores well 
on human development indicators (Table 17), especially literacy. Detailed, structured, 
opinion polls indicated that constituent populations strongly believed that the 
decentralization had improved service delivery outcomes, though with differences on the 
extent of improvement. Besley, Pande and Rao (2006a,b) found, for a large sample of 
rural households in southern India, that decentralized rural participatory democracy 
improved targeting of welfare programs to the poor, though other kinds of public goods 
were more subject to interest group effects. Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006b,c), using a 
20-year longitudinal survey of West Bengal villages, also found that local government 
decision-making was associated with reasonably good targeting of public services, rather 
than any gross form of elite capture. 
  
The examples of well-performing state governments such as Tamil Nadu, and, at 
the local level, Kerala and West Bengal, may be taken to illustrate the importance of 
governmental capacity, in addition to the aspects of institutional design that we have 
discussed throughout this paper. Much of the case for hierarchical control of subnational 
governments in India has rested on concerns about low local capacity.  This argument has 
also been applied to larger urban bodies (e.g., Bhattacharya, 1972), with a perceived lack 
of expertise at the local government level.  In practice, this was translated into direct 
control of decision-making, rather than technical assistance coupled with performance 
monitoring.  To some extent, the lack of capacity in India’s local governments has been a 
self-fulfilling expectation, since decision-makers at that level have not been given the 
opportunity to learn by doing. In that context, the cases of Kerala and West Bengal may 
stand out as ones where state governments have engaged in substantial efforts at 
decentralization well before the local government reforms of the 1990s,71 and therefore 
                                                 
71 See Rao and Singh (2003) for further detail and references on the experience of both states. 
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they may have been the ones best placed to use decentralization to improve public service 
delivery. It is well understood that building local capacity in areas such as budgetary 
management is critical (Finance Commission, 2004, Chapter 8), but there have been 
problems in getting the states to pursue this objective effectively. In fact, many of the 
states’ own fiscal and expenditure management practices reflect a lack of capacity. 
Overall, the skills gradient within government often is very steep, from the elite civil 
service cadres down. Even in the bureaucratic elite specialized financial management 
skills, such as might be required for market-financed infrastructure projects, are not 
necessarily strongly present: the emphasis in training tends to be more toward general 
administration. 
 
 
3.3. Corruption and capture     
Aggregate measures suggest that the quality of India’s governance is poor along 
several dimensions, though not out of line with other developing countries, including 
China – which has a much stronger growth record. However, this does not imply that 
governance is irrelevant. In particular, corruption adds to the cost of doing business (e.g. 
Forbes, 2002), and directly affects productivity. Cross-state regressions for India (Dollar 
et al, 2002) also indicate that the level of harassment, which is typically connected to 
bribe seeking, directly matter for business productivity. These studies suggest that there is 
considerable variation across the states in terms of local aspects of corruption. This does 
not, of course, answer the question of whether corruption has increased with 
decentralization. Conceptually, the potential problem with decentralization is that it 
increases the number of levels at which corruption is possible (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1993) and intensifies competitive corruption. 
 
The evidence from India suggests that corruption is quite pervasive at all levels of 
government. In the 2005 Governance Indicators of the World Bank (Kauffman, Kraay 
and Mastruzzi, 2006), India is in the 47th percentile in “control of corruption,” and in the 
Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International) India is tied for 88th place with 
countries such as Benin, Mali, and Tanzania. Types of corruption include illegal 
payments for hiring, job transfers, procurement contracts and provision of public 
services. Many examples and case studies exist, and we illustrate next.  
 
Wade (1985) documents in detail the system of corruption for state government 
jobs that involve management of public irrigation facilities. In this case, corruption in 
hiring and transfers is connected to corruption in the provision of public services. In other 
cases, there may be corruption in hiring simply because jobs are scarce, and government 
jobs are particularly attractive in terms of relatively high pay and low demands on 
performance. Sivaraman (1991) notes that allocating government jobs as a patronage 
mechanism is an old tradition. A very recent study of the old problem of corruption in 
allocating driving licenses (Bertrand et al, 2006) uses field experiments to identify the 
distortions created by corruption. A study by Transparency International (2002) found 
evidence of “retail corruption” particularly in health care, electric power, police and 
judiciary functions, taxation and land administration, and education. 
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In all these cases, the problems appear to be associated with the organization of 
administration and the nature of political influence. There is no obvious correlation with 
the degree of political or administrative decentralization. In fact, in many case, it is lack 
of local oversight and control that contributes to the problem. In particular, as in the case 
of pure inefficiency (such as absenteeism or low effort), corruption in service delivery 
stems from the lack of effective incentives, both internal to government and external. 
Internal controls exist in theory (see Section 1.2, for example), but are ineffective in 
practice. Essentially, corruption arises from a failure of accountability, and to the extent 
that decentralization can improve accountability (Section 2) it may actually control 
corruption. 
 
In this context, note that accountability is built on transparency, that is, the public 
availability of information that allows performance and processes72 to be measured and 
evaluated.  Thus, transparency can help act as a check on corruption. Information may be 
self-disclosed, or obtained by monitoring and investigation.  Often, though, disclosure of 
information must be a legal requirement, since the incentive to disclose problems will not 
exist, and gathering information may be impossible or very costly without legal backing. 
In the context of rural local government, Bajaj and Sharma (1995) note the problems that 
can arise, in terms of the information required to assess elected officials: 
 When village pradhans were entrusted JRY funds for construction of community assets, the 
village community at large did not have knowledge about the total funds received and the annual 
expenditure incurred on various projects.  The pradhan and the village panchayat officer, who 
jointly operated the panchayat account, kept the details a closely guarded secret. (p. M-79) 
They go on to describe the resolution of the monitoring problem in their example: 
 [The higher level] government made it mandatory for information to be posted publicly 
about the works executed, estimated and actual expenditure and savings if any.  The displaying 
of relevant information on bulletin boards in public places and community halls resulted in 
community pressure on pradhans to account for public funds, and had the effect of many 
unfinished projects being rapidly completed. 
While all cases may not admit such easy fixes, there is no reason why complete 
information on a broad range of government activities should not be available to all 
citizens. This remedy is more likely to work in a decentralized context, to the extent that 
the monitoring tasks are better distributed, and decentralization is more likely to lead to 
disaggregated budgets that can be parsed by citizens. 
 
Capture is a related problem, but distinct – capture of rents generated in an 
economy may be a feature of corruption, but can occur through legitimate political and 
institutional processes. The framers of India’s Constitution opted for a relatively 
centralized, ‘quasi-federal’ system because of concerns about unity and stability, but also 
of inequality and local elite capture of resources.73 Implicit in this choice was the 
                                                 
72 New technologies permit more transparency at all levels of government.  See, for example, Halan 
(2000). 
73 B.R. Ambedkar, in 1939, stated, “I confess I have a partiality for a unitary form of government.  I think 
India needs it.” He made this statement about local government during the Constituent Assembly’s drafting 
of the constitution: “What is a village but a sink of localism, a den of ignorance, narrow mindedness and 
communalism...?” See Rao and Singh (2005) for more detail and references. 
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assumption that the central leadership) politicians and bureaucrats) would be more skilled 
and more honest than state and local politicians. Analyses of recent decentralization to 
the local level in India have therefore been particularly concerned with identifying elite 
capture at the village level. It is arguable that, at the national level, India’s political 
economy has involved competition for rent capture by several key groups, with no single 
group dominating (Bardhan, 1984). At the state level, political power was initially 
disproportionately in the hands of the well-educated, and especially the rural elites. The 
development of India’s democracy has included a process of diffusion of power at the 
state level to lower caste groups that have the advantage of numbers, though not of 
resources or endowments.74
 
Evidence for capture varies across states. As one might expect, states where caste 
politics are more salient, and vestiges of feudalism greater, are more subject to local elite 
capture. For example, Gaiha et al (1998, 2000) conclude the following about Uttar 
Pradesh, based on a qualitative analysis: 
A survey of 3 districts in UP on the implementation of the 2 major antipoverty programs, viz. 
JRY [Jawahar Rozgar Yojana – a centrally sponsored rural development program – since 
superseded – designed to generate employment through infrastructure creation] and IRDP 
[Integrated Rural Development Programme – a similar scheme to JRY] in 1997 points to the 
pervasiveness of rent-seeking behavior in all the Gram Panchayats. As a result, there were large-
scale diversions of resources. The benefits of JRY, IRDP and the other rural development 
programs to the poor were minimum. . . Regardless of whether the Panchayat chairperson 
belonged to upper or lower castes, there was little variation in the method and pattern of 
domination by the locally powerful groups. 
It is probable that similar conclusions can be reached for other states and regions of India 
that are similar to Uttar Pradesh in social structures and level of development. 
 
 On the other hand, there is countervailing evidence for states such as West Bengal 
that have undertaken some degree of social reform in rural areas. Bardhan and 
Mookherjee (2006a, b), through a detailed econometric analysis, found that targeting of 
some publicly funded programs (including provision of private goods such as seed kits) 
by village level governments did not indicate elite capture – most benefits went to small 
and marginal farmers. On the other hand, the poorest rural group, landless laborers, was 
relatively left out of employment generation schemes. In fact, targeting was worse at the 
level of district governments allocating across villages. As one might expect, greater 
economic inequality and heterogeneity worsened targeting of programs to the poor, and 
those programs where transparency was lower were more susceptible to distortion, if not  
full-scale capture. 
 
 Besley, Pande and Rao (2006a, b) and Besley, Pande, Rahman and Rao (2006) 
also explore political economy factors affecting local government allocation of resources, 
using data from four southern states (Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil 
Nadu). Again, there is evidence of political opportunism, but it is not extreme. These 
studies also develop and test the idea that various institutional design factors can impact 
                                                 
74 Béteille (1965) makes an early argument for this process at the local and the state level in Tamil Nadu. 
CASI (2006) traces the evolution of Bihar politics along these lines. 
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local allocation: thus effective gram sabhas and local seat reservations for disadvantaged 
groups help to reduce political opportunism. 
 
 Taken together, the studies of rural local government resource allocation in rural 
India provide indirect, though not direct evidence that accountability mechanisms 
implemented through decentralization can be effective. There is no direct evidence that a 
shift from state level to local decision making improves either efficiency or equity. 
However, the evidence suggests that decentralization does not lead to extreme outcomes 
of local capture, provided the initial conditions and institutional design are both 
supportive. Institutional design is directly a policy concern, but even initial conditions 
can be altered by appropriate interventions, such as local education for capacity building 
(e.g., Vaddiraju and Mehrotra, 2004). The evidence from West Bengal and southern India 
indicates that initial conditions can be altered in the long run through state government 
action, but the newer evidence is based on non-governmental action, and goals of more 
rapid capacity building. 
 
 Capture is less of a concern in urban areas, though the distribution of benefits can 
favor certain groups or income classes. Areas of corruption in urban local government 
include retail corruption in service delivery (e.g., having to pay a bribe to receive any 
service, or to avoid inordinate service lags), tax administration, and, unsurprisingly, in 
procurement for current expenditures as well as capital projects. While, given the nature 
of corruption, it is difficult to document its extent, all the evidence suggests that it is 
pervasive, despite ostensibly strict hierarchical controls such as requiring approvals from 
higher levels for relatively small expenditures (Rao and Singh, 2003). In the case of 
urban retail corruption, media exposure and citizen collective action have jointly led to 
reduction in some cases, e.g., the use of citizen report cards in Bangalore (Paul, 2002, 
2006). At the state level, corruption in procurement is worse than at the national level 
(World Bank, 2003b), but some states are much better than others in this regard, and 
states such as Karnataka and Tamil Nadu have passed legislation requiring transparency 
in public procurement. Processes of negotiation for contracts are particularly non-
transparent and subject to corruption. These are problems of administrative design (e.g., 
Morris, 2003, Section 4.2), and not necessarily associated with decentralization of 
government to subnational levels. The real issue is capacity to monitor bureaucratic 
processes to identify corruption. 
 
 
4. The Way Forward 
Subnational decentralization in India is a political reality, and the pressing issue is 
not whether it has been a positive development, but how to reform policies and 
institutions to maximize the benefits, and minimize any harmful consequences, of 
political and economic decentralization. The objectives of such reform can be 
encapsulated as (1) improving governmental efficiency with respect to taxes and 
expenditures, (2) maintaining some degree of equity through and within the operations of 
the government, and (3) providing some sustainability and stability.  
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4.1 Political Reform 
We begin with political reform. At the state level, there have been calls for 
introducing reservations for women in legislatures (mirroring what was incorporated in 
constitutional amendments for local government strengthening). One could also discuss 
the merits of other reforms of the electoral system, such as proportional representation 
and candidate qualifications (e.g., to control criminality among elected officials). Here 
we do not tackle such issues. There is clearly room for improvement in the conduct of 
elections. Even more so, further developments in media assessment of state governments’ 
performance may improve electoral accountability.75 The practice of ranking how the 
states are doing in providing quality of life for (at least a subset of) their constituents 
represents an example of a positive development in improving electoral accountability.  
 
At the local level, the mandating of regular local elections through the 
constitutional amendments has been a major step forward in local accountability, adding 
voice as an accountability mechanism for the first time. Clearly, some states need to be 
nudged to follow the law in holding elections, and effective monitoring of these elections 
also needs to take place.76 The scale of the task is enormous, and making sure that 
resources are available for properly conducting local elections is an important concern. 
The national government and the courts have a key role to play in this respect. A related 
issue at the national and state level is that of legislative organization and functioning. The 
quality of India’s parliamentary institutions has been criticized, and some reform here 
may also be useful.  
 
Going beyond electoral and legislative institutions, since issues of tax and 
expenditure reform and controlling fiscal deficits require some coordination between the 
center and the states, institutions such as the ISC may have a greater role to play than in 
the past. While states that are pivotal, and hence politically powerful in a coalition 
government at the center, may be able to directly extract concessions from the central 
government, this does not make the ISC redundant. The potential role of the ISC is 
precisely to provide an alternative to such ad hoc bargaining. Bargaining over durable 
changes in rules governing the federation is also quite different from bargaining over 
specific instances.77 For example, the ISC was an important forum for gaining acceptance 
of the change in tax sharing recommended by the Tenth Finance Commission.78 Tax 
reform, changes in the way that states borrow, and regulation of sectors such as power are 
                                                 
75 Majumdar, Mani and Mukand (2003) find theoretical and empirical justification for the idea that better 
informed voters are able to obtain better performance from government. See also Keefer and Khemani 
(2003, 2005). 
76 There may also be a case for changing the law, so that state level legislators are no longer able to hold 
posts in the upper tiers of rural local government. However, this is unlikely to be politically feasible – the 
inclusion of this provision was undoubtedly to enable state level elected officials to protect their local 
patronage powers. 
77 This is an extension of Riker’s instrumentalist view of federalism (Riker, 1975, pp. 113-114), to include 
bargaining not just in constitution making, but also in evolution of subsequent governance, and not just for 
territorial protection or gain, but also over splitting the economic pie. 
78 More recently, it has also been a place where an important change in the rules governing inter-state water 
disputes has been approved by the states (Richards and Singh, 2002). See also Kapur (2005) for additional 
examples. 
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all areas where the ISC can provide a less public, more focused forum for bargaining over 
such issues than is possible in Parliament. The role of the ISC may also be expanded if 
the current process of planning is reformed. The NDC now serves as the bargaining 
forum for plan transfers and loans: if these were replaced by a dual system of block 
grants and market-based loans, it would make the NDC redundant.  
 
 
4.2 Administrative Reform 
While political reforms, by their nature, can be controversial, there is a strong 
case for civil service reform, and more generally, bureaucratic reform at every level. 
Budgeting, expenditure management, accounting and auditing methods, personnel 
policies and tax administration are all areas where India’s governments do not necessarily 
follow best international practices, and there is ample evidence that improvements can be 
made. One cannot overemphasize the importance of very basic improvements in 
government financial management and functioning.79 In addition to reforming internal 
processes, personnel policies would also need to be addressed. Changes in selection and 
training would probably meet the least resistance. Retrenchment, retirement and 
promotion policies would no doubt be more difficult to make. Even if there is little 
progress on changing the personnel make-up of governmental organizations, changing 
the acquired skills and incentive structures for government employees is a critical reform. 
At lower levels within any government organization, skill levels and performance 
incentives are currently particularly lacking. Since hierarchical monitoring has had 
limitations in the past, especially in the context of increased political interference in day-
to-day bureaucratic functioning, accountability must be sought through mechanisms such 
as greater transparency of processes, and public recording of performance wherever 
possible. 
 
The subnational component of administrative reform is significant, since some of 
the greatest problems with respect to organizational capacity and functioning are at the 
state and local level. At the local level (rural and urban) a new set of decision-makers 
must be trained to operate effectively in the context of new expenditure responsibilities 
and revenue authority. Again, training programs are crucial to overcome capacity issues, 
and these will require funding. It is noteworthy that funds allocated for such tasks are not 
being spent –this may be a problem of capacity (lack of those who can impart training, or 
inability of state governments to organize the training) or incentives or both. It is also 
important for states to consider assigning some of their employees to the local level – this 
is often difficult, because it can mean a loss of pay or prestige, but it appears to be a 
natural requirement to accompany decentralization of expenditure assignments. If it 
cannot be done through reassignment, a longer run shift through attrition at the state level 
and local government hiring may be more feasible. All these components of 
administrative reform, including effective decentralization of staff, are critical if 
decentralization is to fully achieve its potential for improvements in service delivery 
without increasing waste or corruption. 
 
                                                 
79 It is noteworthy that the quality of government institutions in India lags so far behind best practice, even 
after a decade and a half of reform. 
 52
PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE OR CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION 
The assignment of expenditure responsibilities offers another area for significant 
reform. While significant responsibilities rest with both state and local governments, a 
major problem is concurrency of assignment. This is a problem because it leads to lack of 
clarity in accountability. Numerous illustrations of this exist, especially at the local level 
(Rao and Singh, 2003). Even within the sphere of local governments, there is too much 
overlap among the three different tiers (village, block and district). While some degree of 
concurrency is inevitable, especially when assignments are broadly conceived and 
specified (e.g., health and education), and constitutional and legislative reassignments 
may create fresh problems, there is a case for developing some degree of contractual 
delegation of expenditure responsibilities from higher to lower level governments, so that 
primary authority for certain kinds of spending is clear. Thus, clarity in expenditure 
assignments may be sought through improvements in administrative organization within 
and across levels of government. In some cases of local government assignments, it may 
well make sense to define subsets of broader areas that are exclusive local 
responsibilities. It may also make sense to strengthen local authority in areas such as land 
use and (some facets of) legal enforcement – currently areas where, even after 
decentralization, states have almost exclusive control. The principles of fiscal 
equivalence (Olson, 1986)80 for subnational authority and of coordination benefits are not 
always well recognized or implemented in the current subnational expenditure 
assignments in India. 
 
 
4.3 Tax Reform  
 Administrative reform and reform of expenditure responsibilities must be 
complemented by reform of tax assignments. One of the greatest weaknesses of Indian 
governance is the failure to create links between benefits and costs (the “Wicksellian 
connection”) for taxpayers and other beneficiaries of public expenditure on service 
delivery (in the latter case, through user charges).  The decentralization of tax 
assignments in practice is effectively much less than that for expenditures, and the current 
system requires unnecessarily large intergovernmental transfers, which creates an 
additional set of problems. The current system of tax assignments is unduly restrictive of 
subnational governments. Several reforms suggest themselves with respect to tax 
assignments, policy and administration. 
 
 First, decentralizing tax assignments will reduce the need for intergovernmental 
transfers, reducing the adverse incentive effects of such transfers. This issue is taken up 
later in this section. Land and property taxes can be more clearly assigned to local 
governments, in cases where state governments have sole or concurrent tax authority, but 
do not exercise it effectively (as is often the case with land revenue). Local administrative 
capacity is a potential problem with this decentralization, but one short-run measure is for 
the state government to continue as a collection agency for some locally-assigned taxes 
(as opposed to shared taxes). Clearly, complementary reforms of tax administration (Das-
Gupta and Mookherjee, 1998) at the state level are crucial to the success of such a 
decentralization of assignments. Ultimately, however, it would be necessary to make tax 
                                                 
80 In particular, the idea is that the locus of benefits and of expenditure responsibility should match as well 
as possible. 
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administration accountable in some way to local governments to ensure proper collection 
effort. Improvement in tax administration at all levels of government remains a pressing 
area for reform, despite being raised repeatedly in high-level policy documents, from the 
Chelliah committee report in 1991 to the Kelkar committee reports in 2004.  
 
 One area where tax assignments have been explicitly centralized pertains to 
taxation of services. Rao (2000) had suggested moving taxation of services from the 
Union list, where it implicitly lay (through the Center’s residual powers over taxes not 
explicitly specified in the Constitution), to the Concurrent list via a constitutional 
amendment.  However, the central government chose instead to explicitly add service 
taxes to the Union List, via the 88th amendment to the Constitution, enacted in January 
2004. According to the new institutional regime for service taxes, they are to be shared 
with the states, in a manner yet to be determined, but by the national parliament, and 
therefore outside the “common pool” that is divided among the states by the Finance 
Commission.  Indeed, it is possible that the sharing of service taxes will be completely 
outside the Commission’s scope in the future, representing a reversal of previous 
measures to simplify the tax-sharing system and make it more efficient. Moving 
assignment of services taxation to the state level is one obvious way to improve the 
Wicksellian connection. 
 
Second, decentralization must not lead to inefficient tax competition. In fact, even 
the relatively centralized system of India has suffered from this problem, due to deviation 
from the constitution’s original intent. The framers of the constitution were aware of the 
need for an internal common market, but included a rather broad escape clause.  Article 
301 of the Constitution states, “Subject to the other provisions of this part, trade, 
commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India shall be free”.  However, 
Article 302 empowers Parliament to impose restrictions on this freedom in the “public 
interest” – a term that is both very broad and not clearly defined in this context. 
According to Article 286 of the Constitution, “No law of a state shall impose, or 
authorise the imposition of the tax on the sale or purchase of goods where such sale or 
purchase takes place (a) outside the state, or (b) in the course of import of goods into, or 
export of goods out of, the territory of India.”  However, based on the recommendations 
of the Taxation Enquiry Commission in 1953, the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution 
added clauses (2) and (3) to enable the central government to levy taxes on inter-state 
transactions. The manner of levying inter-state sales taxes led to significant fiscal 
impediments to free inter-state trade. These issues are being addressed only now, with a 
comprehensive reform of the sales tax system, and movement to a destination-based VAT 
system (Rao and Rao, 2006). The problem has been even more severe in some ways at 
the local level, with the use of “octroi,” a local (urban area) goods-entry tax. In some 
cases, states have replaced octroi with a state-level entry tax, which has similar 
distortionary effects. At the local level, doing away with octroi requires development of 
effective urban property tax regimes. 
 
Third, a key tax reform – involving a different aspect of decentralization – that 
should be considered is to allow lower level governments to piggyback on the central 
income tax. This allows for efficiencies in collection and tax administration more 
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generally, and gives states and local governments the possibility of raising funds at the 
margin to cover marginal expenditures as determined by constituents of subnational 
jurisdictions, or their elected representatives. Similarly, local governments can be given 
the authority to piggyback on state sales taxes. This kind of reform would be a novelty 
for India, but seems to work quite well in other federal systems (the United States in 
particular). It differs from the current system of tax sharing or assignment, in giving each 
level of government autonomy at the margin, rather than having a predetermined 
exclusive assignment, unclear assignments of similar taxes on similar bases (e.g., excise 
and sales taxes at the center and state levels), or administratively determined splits of tax 
revenue where the tax rates are decided entirely by the higher level government. It is 
entirely possible to impose legal maxima and minima on rates set by lower level 
governments in such cases of piggybacking, to prevent tax competition from becoming a 
problem. Services taxation, if not reassigned to the states, could also be a candidate for 
piggybacking by both state and local governments, since many personal services are local 
in nature, and the tax bases are relatively immobile.  
 
 
4.4 Reform of the Intergovernmental Transfer System 
The intergovernmental transfer system provides the most obvious and perhaps the 
politically easiest arena for reforms. Possible barriers to reform do include the desire of 
bureaucrats and politicians to control the disbursement of funds for direct personal gain 
or for patronage purposes. However, in many cases, the ultimate intended recipients of 
the funds can provide an effective lobby for reform, if the case is made clearly enough, 
and if there are no immediate losers. India’s intergovernmental transfer system is 
currently extremely complex and inefficient, as argued in Section 1.5, suggesting that 
Pareto improvements may be possible. Precedent has been extremely important for some 
components of this system, yet positive reforms have also been effected in the past. The 
major change in center-state tax sharing implemented in 2000 went from academic 
suggestions to finance commission recommendation to political bargaining and passing 
of a constitutional amendment in about six years. 
 
An important characteristic of the current intergovernmental transfer system is the 
poor incentives it provides for fiscal discipline by recipient governments. In particular, 
this has contributed to the fiscal problems of state governments. For the national 
government, revenue is essentially raised and spent entirely within its jurisdiction, and its 
performance can be judged by how efficiently these tasks are accomplished. For 
subnational governments, however, tax-sharing and discretionary categorical grants 
create significant complications for accountability. A state’s total resources depend on the 
decisions of the center with respect to revenue-raising, and potentially on the spending of 
the other states as well. This is referred to as a “common pool problem” (e.g. Purfield, 
2003; Hausmann and Purfield, 2004). The latter paper picturesquely compares it to what 
happens when an individual goes to a restaurant in a group and orders lobster, whereas if 
he were alone, he would have ordered a cheaper item, chicken. However, this analogy 
oversimplifies, masking the problem and, therefore, the solution. In the example, the 
implicit assumption is that the bill will be equally divided. Hence the marginal cost of an 
individual order of lobster is split among the entire group. Suppose instead that the 
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marginal cost versus chicken of all the lobster orders is separated out and divided among 
only those who order lobster. Then the common pool problem goes away. The key idea is 
that marginal incentives must be right, so that, in the case of India’s states, they must bear 
the full marginal cost of their spending. Singh (2006) calls this, straightforwardly, the 
“Marginal Principle” of intergovernmental transfers, well known to economists in its 
general incarnation. 
 
With this “Marginal Principle” in mind, scattered and uneven discussions (e.g., 
Purfield, 2003) of the common pool problem, transfer dependence, soft budget 
constraints, and moral hazard can all be examined within a unified conceptual 
framework. For example, problems of soft budget constraints and moral hazard are just a 
dynamic version of the Marginal Principle, with the external source of marginal funds 
coming with a lag, through bailouts by the central government. One caveat should be 
noted: transfer dependence can still lead to income effects on states’ behavior, even when 
transfers are inframarginal. However, if one objective of transfers is to improve 
horizontal equity, these income effects may be desirable. Furthermore, they do not, by 
themselves, create an incentive for fiscal laxity. Having said this, it is possible that the 
political economy of transfer dependence may make it harder to follow the Marginal 
Principle,81 and this argues for altering tax assignments to substantially reduce transfer 
dependence, as suggested earlier, in Section 4.3. 
 
One can make a case for the Finance Commission and Planning Commission 
overhauling their transfer formulae completely, to achieve greater simplicity, 
transparency and effectiveness with respect to meeting their objectives. The Finance 
Commission’s current methodology is non-transparent in its rationale and its outcomes. 
To meet horizontal equity objectives, theory would suggest using measures of structure, 
such as population density, overall size, topography, and levels of economic activity, to 
establish minimum norms for tax and expenditure levels, which could then be used to 
determine transfers that would sustain minimum expenditure levels for a state that 
behaves according to the norm (Rao and Singh, 2005; Bagchi and Chakraborty, 2003). 
States can then raise and spend money at the margin, without any distortionary effect of 
transfers. Instead, the Finance Commission uses various criteria in the formula itself, 
calculating tax shares based on this, without being able to assess if the transfers are 
adequate or not. To some extent, shortfalls are met through grants, but the use of ad hoc 
grants based on ex post gaps (after the preliminary devolution is calculated) has the 
potential to undermine incentives.  
 
The proposed approach is very different from the idea of using the 
intergovernmental transfer system to provide very refined or targeted incentives to meet 
                                                 
81 Hausmann and Purfield (2004) discuss the possibility that federal systems with large vertical imbalances 
encourage political bargaining. In fact, one can frame this as an indirect violation of the Marginal Principle, 
since lobbying behavior affects marginal transfers. Jonathan Rodden (personal communication) has made 
an important related point: even if the center stops making explicit guarantees, voters and creditors are very 
likely to continue to perceive implicit ones in a system with such high levels of transfer-dependence.  He 
notes that in other countries, the credit ratings of highly transfer-dependent subnational entities are tightly 
clustered around the sovereign rating of the higher-level government. Thus, transfer-dependence has a 
direct impact on expectations of market actors about the likelihood of future bailouts.   
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general fiscal balance goals.82 The key idea is that transfers should not be linked to 
spending plans or projected resource gaps. This is the best way to respect the Marginal 
Principle. Once minimum levels of spending (predicated on the states’ norms of fiscal 
effort) are met through these equalizing transfers, the remaining amount of transfers can 
be determined by pure tax-sharing considerations, based on the states’ income shares. 
Grants based on marginal needs, and any form of categorical grants (which are subject to 
fungibility anyway) would be done away with in the above restructuring. 
 
With respect to the Planning Commission, there is also a case for overhaul. 
Planning Commission grants are meant to be for developmental purposes, which might 
be interpreted as capital spending, although investments in human capital are typically 
counted as current spending according to budgeting conventions. One can make a case 
(Singh, 2006) for the Planning Commission restricting itself to certain types of broad 
categorical grants, and making allocations based on transparent normative criteria, 
paralleling those proposed for the Finance Commission. The states could be left to choose 
projects within broad categories. Loan components could be done away with, as 
recommended by the Twelfth Finance Commission. The Planning Commission could 
also play a stronger role in designing and coordinating individual ministry schemes, 
which have otherwise proliferated into a chaotic jumble. The need for better monitoring 
of the outcomes of all these transfer schemes has been repeatedly expressed, but it is 
unclear what progress has been made. 
 
An alternative reform would lead to a more radical change in the Planning 
Commission’s role (Singh and Srinivasan, 2006). This would be to reconstitute the 
Planning Commission as a Fund for Public Investment (FPI) for both the center and 
states. Its share holders would be the state and central governments.  The Fund, much like 
a multilateral development bank, would appraise the projects proposed to it for their 
economic and social returns as well as feasibility and soundness of proposed financing 
(from the center or state’s own resources, borrowing from domestic and foreign sources 
and capital transfers from the center, if relevant). This alternative is considered further in 
the next section, on subnational borrowing. 
 
With either kind of overhaul of the Planning Commission, it would be useful for 
the center to come to grips with transfers made by central ministries. Currently, these are 
poorly designed, coordinated and implemented. Repeated attempts to consolidate various 
“schemes” have been less than successful. Categorical grants by the center theoretically 
have a role to play in correcting externalities or promoting national merit goods, but 
current practice is closer to a disorganized scramble to dispense patronage. Since there is 
no obvious a priori institutional restriction one can place on transfers that are inherently 
discretionary, improvements in legislative, administrative and central cabinet review and 
oversight may be the only solution. Again, the Planning Commission, which has 
ostensibly been responsible for monitoring, has not been up to the task so far, though in 
its defense one can argue that the design, proliferation and malleability (old schemes are 
                                                 
82 The current system attempts to combine multiple objectives into overall formulae. Adding complex ways 
of rewarding fiscal discipline, as in tying some portion of intergovernmental transfers to state-level fiscal 
reforms, only compounds the problem. 
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often rolled into new ones) of these central schemes has made assessment of outcomes 
difficult. 
 
At the state-local level, to use the term ‘reform’ with respect to intergovernmental 
transfers may be misleading, since the process is so new, and is still evolving. Rapid 
intervention may help to create positive precedents for institutional functioning, and this 
may be a crucial area for policy education. While each state has constituted at least one 
State Finance Commission (SFC), and several states are on their third SFC, the quality of 
these reports is generally poor, as measured both by intellectual and policy-making 
standards. Many state governments have failed to take their SFC reports seriously, 
ignoring recommendations when it suits them. Lack of timeliness in all stages of the 
process has also been a problem. The Twelfth Finance Commission report (Finance 
Commission, 2004, Chapter 8) details all the problems, and also suggests solutions, 
though often they are in the nature of exhortations for improved practices.  
 
Concrete measures the states can take include incorporation of guidelines for 
SFCs into legislation, as a way of committing to the process. Many of the problems flow 
from the overall poor functioning of the states’ political and administrative machinery, 
and only more effective state level electoral accountability may make a difference there. 
Better data will improve the functioning of the SFCs, both directly, and through more 
complete monitoring and benchmarking of their performance. Perhaps the most important 
catalyst, however, would be giving the states a firmer footing for their own revenues, 
through reforms of tax assignment and administration, allowing them to address local 
government needs in a less constrained manner. It can be seen from this discussion, and 
earlier parts of this section, that reforms along several dimensions are intertwined, and 
must be implemented in concert for greater success.  
 
 
4.5 Reform of subnational borrowing 
Nascent reforms in subnational borrowing mechanisms were described in Section 
1.6. In brief, initial attempts to reduce burgeoning state level fiscal deficits involved 
increasingly sophisticated methods of hierarchical control, using various carrots and 
sticks. Purely discretionary hierarchical control is unlikely to work, given the complexity 
of the states’ situations, and the ease with which a sovereign national government can use 
escape clauses to bail out subnational governments. State level fiscal responsibility 
legislations, following the center’s lead, provide more of a commitment device, since the 
concerned state government can then be publicly held to a measurable standard of fiscal 
performance.83 These methods of managing subnational fiscal performance do not 
specifically deal with borrowing or borrowing mechanisms, though they can and do 
include clauses to limit the total debt levels of the borrowing governments. In particular, 
despite their limitations, both hierarchical and self-imposed legislative limits on 
subnational borrowing are important in the short and medium run, since alternative fiscal 
disciplining mechanisms will take time to develop, and will require complementary 
                                                 
83 This public standard-setting feature has been apparent at the national level, where actual and proposed 
relaxations of FRBM targets have been subject to substantial political and media scrutiny. 
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reforms in administration, tax assignments, and the intergovernmental transfer system to 
be fully effective.84
 
The most important, and direct, reform of borrowing mechanisms involves 
replacing non-transparent, discretionary subnational borrowing (much like relationship 
banking) with market-disciplined borrowing (arm’s length financing). Ultimately, as we 
have argued, this is the only way to at least partially respect the Marginal Principle, since 
borrowing from the central government is subject to a dynamic common pool problem.85 
As noted in Section 2.3, the functioning of credit markets in India is in its infancy, and 
trading and rating institutions have to develop, even at the national and corporate levels. 
One pervasive practice that tends to undermine making market borrowing truly effective 
as a fiscal disciplining device is the use of guarantees by higher level governments.86 
However, even with these guarantees, market borrowing is more transparent and efficient 
than borrowing from higher level governments. The use of development funds (e.g., the 
Tamil Nadu Urban Development Fund, or TNUDF) as intermediaries for financing 
infrastructure represents a transitional step towards market borrowing, though much will 
depend on how these funds operate in practice.87 In these cases, transparency and 
professionalism in lending can be developed as a precursor to fully market-disciplined 
borrowing from the private sector. 
 
The institutional reforms required for market-based borrowing are many. The 
previous ad hoc and opaque process of borrowing by the states did not facilitate the 
development of effective internal processes to allow external assessment of proposed 
projects. Improvements in financial information, budgeting and accounting practices, 
regulatory norms and monitoring are all required here, as well as changes in the 
institutional rules (IMF, 2003; Hausmann and Purfield, 2004). These reforms parallel 
                                                 
84 These complementary reforms have been discussed in other sections of this paper. I am grateful to 
Jonathan Rodden for emphasizing this perspective. The need for coordinated reforms also bears on World 
Bank plans to lend to subnational units in India without explicit central government guarantees. For this to 
be successful, building institutional and fiscal capacity at the subnational level may be a prerequisite. See 
Chakraborty and Rao (2006) for a cautionary analysis of this issue. 
85 It is still possible that state governments will require bailouts in extraordinary circumstances, but a priori 
market discipline can restrict the frequency of such occurrences. The political economy of such bailouts is 
also made more transparent, as compared to the current system of regular debt rescheduling, write-offs and 
implicit subsidies. Note that true market discipline will require other sources of borrowing and central 
government guarantees to be limited, and lenders to also face the test of the market. In particular, as argued 
earlier, the states must not have easy access to captive sources of finance, including nationalized financial 
institutions. Thus, fiscal reform is ultimately closely tied to, and dependent on, financial sector reform 
(Singh and Srinivasan, 2005a, 2005b). As noted earlier, the Twelfth Finance Commission Report also 
proposes annual ceilings on state borrowing, which would further harden budget constraints. Again, some 
of the poorest states may require special treatment in terms of central loans, since they may not be able to 
utilize market borrowing, but they can be identified, rather than the presumption being that all states need 
to rely on the center for capital funds. 
86 In some cases, these guarantees are not explicit, but are still recognized. For example, CRISIL’s rating of 
the long-term debt of the Hyderabad Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board (HMWSSB) states 
that it is “based on the strong support the Board receives from the Government of Andhra Pradesh.” 
87 Peterson (2003) argues that the TNUDF is a worldwide leader in designing systems to attract new 
financing sources and introducing instruments that are consistent with a deregulated financial sector and 
nascent domestic capital market. 
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many of those required for India’s financial sector as a whole: state governments just 
happen to have been among the most powerful of those entities taking advantage of 
poorly functioning credit markets to run up unpaid debts. Reforms that are already under 
discussion or taking place include statutory or administrative borrowing ceilings, 
guarantee redemption funds, explicit restructuring and write-offs, and development of 
market-based borrowing institutions such as auctions conducted by the RBI. The RBI is 
also exploring the further development of secondary markets for government debt, credit 
ratings, and methods of regulation and monitoring. In this context, one may reiterate the 
perspective given earlier, that the proper sequence of development might be national 
bond markets, then development of state and local project assessment and management, 
and revenue capacity, with a full-fledged market for subnational borrowing following on 
these broader and more fundamental reforms. 
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BJP: Bharatiya Janata Party 
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CRISIL: Credit Rating Information Services of India Limited 
DFI: Development Finance Institution 
FC: Finance Commission 
FDI: Foreign Direct Investment 
FRBM: Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management 
HDI: Human Development Index  
IAS: Indian Administrative Service 
IAAS: Indian Audit and Accounts Service  
ICAS: Indian Civil Accounts Service  
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IRS: Indian Revenue Service  
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RBI: Reserve Bank of India 
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STP: Software Technology Park 
TFP: Total Factor Productivity 
TNUDF: Tamil Nadu Urban Development Fund  
UT: Union Territory 
VAT: Value Added Tax  
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Table 1: Basic Characteristics of States 
 
 Area 
(Sq.  Km) 
Population 
(in ‘000) 
Density of 
Pop 
NSDP 
1999-00 
Rs.  
Million 
Per capita 
NSDP 
(1999-00) 
Percentage 
of Total 
Area 
Percentage 
of Total 
population
Percentage 
of Total 
NSDP 
High Income States 601800 194065 322.5 4065770 22461 18.31 18.90 28.74 
Gujarat 196000 50597 258.1 896060 18685 5.96 4.93 6.33 
Goa 3800 1344 353.7 58620 44613 0.12 0.13 0.41 
Haryana 44000 21083 479.2 424880 21551 1.34 2.05 3.00 
Maharashtra 308000 96752 314.1 2131510 22604 9.37 9.42 15.07 
Punjab 50000 24289 485.8 554700 23254 1.52 2.37 3.92 
Middle Income States 725000 302633 417.4 4867930 17635 22.05 29.47 34.41 
Andhra Pradesh 275000 75728 275.4 1117530 14878 8.36 7.37 7.90 
Karnataka 192000 52734 274.7 862980 16654 5.84 5.13 6.10 
Kerala 39000 31839 816.4 569260 17709 1.19 3.10 4.02 
Tamil Nadu 130000 62111 477.8 1143090 18623 3.95 6.05 8.08 
West Bengal 89000 80221 901.4 1175070 14874 2.71 7.81 8.31 
Low Income States 1409300 458682 325.5 4022290 9013 42.87 44.66 28.44 
Bihar 94000 82879 881.7 383260 4813 2.86 8.07 2.71 
Chhattisgarh 135100 20796 153.9 213310 10405 4.11 2.02 1.51 
Jharkhand 79700 26909 337.6 232270 9223 2.42 2.62 1.64 
Madhya Pradesh 308000 60385 196.1 677780 11626 9.37 5.88 4.79 
Orissa 156000 36707 235.3 311950 8733 4.75 3.57 2.21 
Rajasthan 342000 56473 165.1 710200 13046 10.40 5.50 5.02 
Uttaranchal 53500 8480 158.5 na na 1.63 0.83 0.00 
Uttar Pradesh 241000 166053 689.0 1493520 9323 7.33 16.17 10.56 
General Category States 2736100 955380 349.2 12955990 14476 83.23 93.02 91.59 
Special Category States 540500 55182 102.1 639300 12339 16.44 5.37 4.52 
Arunachal Pradesh 84000 1091 13.0 14270 13352 2.56 0.11 0.10 
Assam 78000 26638 341.5 2533300 9720 2.37 2.59 1.79 
Himachal Pradesh 56000 6077 108.5 106570 17786 1.70 0.59 0.75 
Jammu & Kashmir 222000 10070 45.4 121820 12373 6.75 0.98 0.86 
Manipur 22000 2389 108.6 28580 12721 0.67 0.23 0.20 
Meghalaya 23000 2306 100.3 29040 12063 0.70 0.22 0.21 
Mizoram 21000 891 42.4 12880 14909 0.64 0.09 0.09 
Nagaland 17000 1989 117.0 23300 12594 0.52 0.19 0.16 
Sikkim 7000 540 77.1 7580 14751 0.21 0.05 0.05 
Tripura 10500 3191 303.9 41930 13195 0.32 0.31 0.30 
All States 3276600 1010562 308.4 13595290 14359 99.67 98.40 96.11 
UTs 10974 16453 1499.3 549870 31211 0.33 1.60 3.89 
Total 3287574 1027015 312.4 14145160 13778 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
 
Source: Rao and Singh, 2005, Table 4.1 
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Table 2: Basic Characteristics of Local Governments (14 Major States) 
 
Number of rural local 
bodies (RLBs) 
Population per elected body 
(`000s) 
 
Rural local bodies (RLBs) State District Block Village State 
assembly District Block Village 
Area 
per 
village 
LB 
 
Number 
of 
urban 
local 
bodies 
Population 
per urban 
local body 
(`000s) 
Andhra Pradesh 22 1093 21784 66,508 2210.0 44.5 2.2 12 116 154.2 
Bihar 55 726 12181 86,374 1364.0 103.3 6.2 14 170 66.8 
Gujarat 19 184 13547 41,310 1424.4 147.1 2.0 14 149 95.6 
Haryana 16 111 5958 16,464 775.6 111.8 2.1 7 82 49.4 
Karnataka 27 175 5673 44,977 1150.7 177.5 5.5 33 215 64.7 
Kerala 14 152 990 29,099 1529.9 140.9 21.6 36 58 132.4 
Madhya Pradesh 45 459 31126 66,181 1129.8 110.8 1.6 14 404 38.0 
Maharashtra 29 319 27611 78,937 1668.8 151.7 1.8 11 244 125.2 
Orissa 30 314 5255 31,660 914.2 87.3 5.2 29 102 41.5 
Punjab 17 138 11591 20,282 840.5 103.5 1.2 4 137 43.7 
Rajasthan 32 237 9184 44,006 1060.6 143.2 3.7 37 183 55.0 
Tamil Nadu 28 385 12593 55,859 1313.6 95.5 2.9 10 744 25.6 
Uttar Pradesh 83 904 58620 139,112 1343.5 123.3 1.9 5 684 40.4 
West Bengal 17 340 3314 68,078 2904.1 145.2 14.9 26 122 153.3 
India 499 5905 232278 1259.9 106.5 2.7 13 3682 59.1  
 
 
Number of elected representatives to: Population per elected representative to: 
Rural local bodies Rural local bodies 
 
Parliament State 
assembly District Block Village 
Parliament State 
assembly District Block Village 
Andhra Pradesh 42 294 1093 14644 230529 1,583,524 226,218 44,484 3,320 211 
Bihar 54 324 1585 15344 165452 1,599,527 266,588 47,332 4,889 453 
Gujarat 26 182 761 3814 123470 1,588,830 226,976 35,563 7,096 219 
Haryana 10 90 303 2418 54159 1,646,365 182,929 40,953 5,132 229 
Karnataka 28 224 919 3340 80627 1,606,329 200,791 33,808 9,302 385 
Kerala 20 140 300 1547 10270 1,454,926 207,847 71,394 13,845 2,086 
Madhya Pradesh 40 320 946 9097 474351 1,654,529 206,816 53,745 5,589 107 
Maharashtra 48 288 1762 3524 303545 1,644,525 274,087 27,466 13,733 159 
Orissa 21 147 854 5260 81077 1,507,606 215,372 32,113 5,214 338 
Punjab 13 117 274 2441 87842 1,560,151 173,350 52,149 5,854 163 
Rajasthan 25 200 997 5257 119419 1,760,240 220,030 34,041 6,456 284 
Tamil Nadu 39 234 648 6499 97398 1,432,281 238,713 56,761 5,660 378 
Uttar Pradesh 85 473 2551 58165 682670 1,636,615 294,106 43,711 1,917 163 
West Bengal 42 294 723 8579 50345 1,620,904 231,558 68,285 5,755 981 
India 543 4120 13484 128581 2580261 1,558,568     
 
Source: Chaudhuri (2003) 
Note: Figures predate creation of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Uttaranchal 
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Table 3 
 
Illustrative List of Developmental Subjects (Other Than Financial Subjects) 
Included in the Union, State, and Concurrent Lists in the Seventh Schedule of the 
Constitution 
 
(A) Union List 
S.  
No. 
Entry 
No. 
Subject  
1 6 Atomic energy and mineral resources necessary for its production 
2 22 Railways 
3. 23 Highways declared by or under law made by Parliament to be national highways 
4. 24 Shipping and navigation on inland waterways, declared by Parliament by law to be national waterways, as 
regards mechanically propelled vessels the rule of the road on such waterways. 
5. 25 Maritime shipping and navigation including shipping and navigation on tidal waters provision of 
education and training for the mercantile marine and regulation of such education and training provided 
by States and other agencies. 
6. 26 Lighthouses, lightships, beacons and other provision for the safety of shipping and aircraft. 
7. 27 Ports declared by or under law made by Parliament or existing law to be major ports, including their 
delimitation and the constitution and powers of port authorities therein. 
8. 28 Port quarantine, including hospitals connected therewith seamen's and marine hospitals. 
9. 29 Airways aircraft and air-navigation provision of aerodromes; regulation and organisation of air traffic and 
of aerodromes; provision for aeronautical education and training and regulation of such education and 
training provided by States and other agencies. 
10. 30 Carriage of passengers and goods by railways, sea or air, or by national waterways in mechanically 
propelled vessels. 
11. 31 Posts and telegraph: telephones, wireless, broadcasting and other form of communications. 
12. 41 Trade and commerce with foreign countries; import and export across customs frontiers; definition of 
customs frontiers. 
13. 42 Inter-State trade and commerce. 
14. 52 Industries, the control of which by the Union is declared by parliament by law to be expedient in the 
public interest. 
15. 53 Regulation and development of oilfields and mineral oil resources; petroleum and petroleum products; 
other liquids and substances declared by Parliament by law to be dangerously inflammable. 
16. 54 Regulation of mines and mineral development to the extent which such regulation and development under 
the control of the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest. 
17. 56 Regulation and development of inter-State rivers and river valleys to the extent to which such regulation 
and development under the control of the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the 
public interest. 
18. 57 Fishing and fisheries beyond territorial waters. 
19. 65 Union agenda and institutions for - 
a.  professional, vocational or technical training including the training of police officers; or 
b.  the promotion of special studies or research; or 
c.  scientific or technical assistance in the investigation or detection of crime. 
20. 66 Coordination and determination of standards in institutions for higher education or research and scientific 
and technical institutions. 
21. 68 Survey of India, the geological, botanical, zoological and anthropological surveys of India, meteorological 
organizations. 
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(B) State List 
S.  No. Entry No. Subject  
1 5 Local government, that is to say, the constitution and powers of municipal corporations, 
improvements trusts, district boards, mining settlement authorities and other local authorities for 
the purpose of local self-government or village administration. 
2 6 Public health and sanitation; hospitals and dispensaries 
3. 9 Relief of the disabled and unemployable. 
4. 13 Communications, that is to say, roads, bridges, ferries, and other means of communication not 
specified in List I: municipal tramways; ropeways;  inland waterways and traffic thereon subject 
to the provisions of List I and List II with regard to such waterways; vehicles other than 
mechanically propelled vehicles. 
5. 14 Agriculture, including agricultural education and research, protection against pests  and 
prevention of plant diseases. 
6. 15 Preservation, protection and improvement of stock and prevention of animal diseases; 
veterinary training and practice. 
7. 17 Water, that is to say, water supplies, irrigation and canals, drainage, embankments, water 
storage and water power subject to the provisions of entry 56 of List I. 
8. 18 Land, that is to say, rights in or over land, land tenures including the relations of landlord and 
tenant, and the collection of rents; transfer and alienation of agricultural land; land improvement 
and agricultural loans; colonization. 
9. 21 Fisheries 
10. 23 Regulation of mines and mineral development subject to the provisions of List I with respect to 
regulation and development under the control of the Union. 
11. 24 Industries subject to the provisions of entries 7 and 52 of List I. 
12. 25 Gas and gas-works 
13. 26 Trade and commerce within the State subjects to the provisions of entry 33 of List III. 
14. 27 Production, supply and distribution of goods subject to the provisions of entry 33 of List III. 
15. 32 Cooperative societies 
16. 35 Works, lands and buildings vested in or in the possession of the State. 
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(C) Concurrent List 
S.  No. Entry 
No. 
Subject  
1 17A Forests 
2. 20 Economic and social planning 
3. 20A Population control and family planning 
4. 23 Social security and social insurance; employment and unemployment 
5. 25 Education, including technical education, medical education and universities, subject to the 
provisions of entries 63, 64, 65 and 66 of List I; vocational and technical training of labor. 
6. 27 Relief and rehabilitation of persons displaced from their original place of residence by reasons of the 
setting up of the Dominions of India and Pakistan. 
7. 31 Ports other than those declared by or under law made by Parliament or existing law to be major 
ports. 
8. 32 Shipping and navigation and inland waterways as regards mechanically propelled vessels, and the 
rule of the road on such waterways, and the carriage of passengers and goods on inland waterways 
subject to the provisions of List I with regard to national waterways. 
9. 33 Trade and commerce in, and the production supply and distribution of - 
a.     the products of any industry where the control of such industry by the Union is  
       declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest and imported               
goods on inland waterways subject to the provisions of List I with regard to national           
waterways. 
b.      foodstuffs, including edible oilseeds and oils; 
c.      cattle fodder, including oilseeds and other concentrates; 
d.      raw cotton, where ginned or unginned and cotton seed; and 
e.      raw jute. 
10. 36 Factories 
11. 37 Boilers 
12. 38 Electricity 
 
 
Source: Rao and Singh (2005) 
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Table 4: Local Government Constitutional Assignments 
 
Rural Governments: Eleventh Schedule (Article 243G) 
  
1. Agriculture, including agricultural extension. 
2. Land improvement, implementation of land reforms, land consolidation and soil conservation. 
3. Minor irrigation, water management and watershed development. 
4. Animal husbandry, dairying and poultry. 
5. Fisheries. 
6. Social forestry and farm forestry. 
7. Minor forest produce. 
8. Small scale industries, including food processing industries. 
9. Khadi, village and cottage industries. 
10. Rural housing. 
11. Drinking water. 
12. Fuel and fodder. 
13. Roads, culverts, bridges, ferries, waterways and other means of communication. 
14. Rural electrification, including distribution of electricity. 
15. Non-conventional energy sources. 
16. Poverty alleviation programme. 
17. Education, including primary and secondary schools. 
18. Technical training and vocational education. 
19. Adult and non-formal education. 
20. Libraries. 
21. Cultural activities. 
22. Markets and fairs. 
23. Health and sanitation, including hospitals, primary health centres and dispensaries. 
24. Family welfare. 
25. Women and child development. 
26. Social welfare, including welfare of the handicapped and mentally retarded. 
27. Welfare of the weaker sections, and in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled 
Tribes. 
28. Public distribution system. 
29. Maintenance of community assets. 
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Urban Governments: Twelfth Schedule (Article 243W) 
  
1. Urban planning including town planning. 
2. Regulation of land-use and construction of buildings. 
3. Planning for economic and social development. 
4. Roads and bridges. 
5. Water supply for domestic, industrial and commercial purposes. 
6. Public health, sanitation conservancy and solid waste management. 
7. Fire services. 
8. Urban forestry, protection of the environment and promotion of ecological aspects. 
9. Safeguarding the interests of weaker sections of society, including the handicapped and 
mentally retarded. 
10. Slum improvement and upgradation. 
11. Urban poverty alleviation. 
12. Provision of urban amenities and facilities such as parks, gardens, playgrounds. 
13. Promotion of cultural, educational and aesthetic aspects. 
14. Burials and burial grounds; cremations, cremation grounds; and electric crematoriums. 
15. Cattle pounds; prevention of cruelty to animals. 
16. Vital statistics including registration of births and deaths. 
17. Public amenities including street lighting, parking lots, bus stops and public conveniences. 
18. Regulation of slaughter houses and tanneries. 
 
 80
PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE OR CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION 
Table 5: Taxation Heads Assigned to the Union and the States in the Constitution 
(As Listed in the Seventh Schedule) 
 
Union States 
Entry in List 
I of the 
Seventh 
Schedule 
Head Entry in List 
II of the 
Seventh 
Schedule 
Head 
82 Taxes on income other than 
agricultural income 
45 Land revenue, including the assessment 
and collection of revenue, the maintenance 
of land records, survey for revenue 
purposes. 
83 Duties of customs including export 
duties 
46 Taxes on agricultural income 
84 Duties of excise on tobacco and 
other goods manufactured or 
produced in India except- 
 
a.  alcoholic liquors for human 
   consumption; 
b.  opium, Indian hemp and other     
narcotic drugs and narcotics;         
but including medicinal and           
toilet preparations containing 
   alcohol or any substance  
   included in sub-paragraph (b) 
   of this entry. 
47 Duties in respect of succession of 
agricultural land 
85 Corporation tax 48 Estate duty in respect of agricultural land 
86 Taxes on the capital value of the 
assets, exclusive of agricultural 
land of individuals and companies; 
taxes on the capital of companies 
49 Taxes on lands and buildings 
87 Estate duty in respect of property 
other than agricultural land. 
50 Taxes on mineral rights subject to any 
limitations imposed by Parliament by law 
relating to mineral development 
88 Duties in respect of succession to 
property other than agricultural 
land  
51 Duties of excise on the following goods 
manufactured or produced in the State and 
countervailing duties at the same or lower 
rates on similar goods manufactured or 
produced elsewhere in India: 
a.  alcohol liquors for human consumption;
b.  opium, Indian hemp and other narcotic    
drugs and narcotics; but not including        
medicinal and toilet preparations              
containing alcohol or any substance           
included in sub-paragraph (b) of this         
entry.   
89 Terminal taxes on goods or 
passengers carried by railway, sea 
or air: taxes on railway fares and 
freights. 
52 Taxes on the entry of goods into a local 
area for consumption, use or sale therein. 
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Table 5 (contd.) 
 
90 Taxes other than stamp duties on 
transactions in stock exchanges and 
future markets 
53 Taxes on the consumption or sale of electricity 
91 Rates of stamp duty in respect of 
bills of exchange, cheques, 
promissory notes, bills of lading, 
letters of credit, policies of 
insurance, transfer of shares, 
debentures, proxies and receipts. 
@54 Taxes on the sale or purchase of goods other 
than newspapers, subject to the provisions of 
entry 92A of List I. 
92 Taxes on the sale or 
purchase of newspapers and on 
advertisements published therein. 
55 Taxes on advertisements other than 
advertisements published in the newspaper @@ 
and advertisements broadcast by radio or 
television. 
*92A Taxes on the sale or 
purchase of goods other than 
newspapers, where such sale or 
purchase takes place in the course of 
inter-State trade or commerce. 
56 Taxes on goods and passengers carried 
by road or on inland waterways. 
**92B Taxes on the consignment 
of goods (whether the consignment 
is to the person making it or to any 
other person), where such 
consignment takes place in the 
course of inter-State trade or 
commerce. 
57 Taxes on vehicles, whether 
mechanically propelled or not, suitable for use 
on roads including tramcars, subject to the 
provision of entry 35 of List III. 
97 Any other matter not 
enumerated in  List II or List III 
including any tax   not mentioned in 
either or both the Lists. 
58 Taxes on animals and boats 
  59 Tolls 
  60 Taxes on professions, trades, callings and 
employments 
  61 Capitation taxes 
  62 Taxes on luxuries, including taxes on      
entertainments, amusements, betting and  
gambling.   
  63 Rates of stamp duty in respect of documents 
other than those specified in the provision of List 
I with regard to rates of stamp duty. 
 
* Ins.  by the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act, 1956 s.2 
** Ins.  by the Constitution (Forty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1982, s.5 
@ Sub.  by the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act 1956, s.2 for entry 54 
@@ Ins.  by the Constitution (Forth-second Amendment) Act, 1975, s.57 (w.e.f.  31.1.1977) 
 
Source: Rao and Singh (2005) 
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Table 6:   Composition of Central Transfers to States (Rs.  Billion, Percentages) 
 
 
Finance Commission 
Transfers 
Plan Grants Plan Periods 
/ Years 
Tax  
Devolution 
Grants Total 
  
State Plan 
Schemes 
Central 
Schemes
Total 
  
Other 
Grants 
Total 
Fourth Plan 45.60 8.60 54.20 10.80 9.70 20.50 9.30 83.90 
(1969-74) (54.35) (10.25) (64.60) (12.87) (11.56) (24.43) (11.08) (100.00) 
Fifth Plan 82.70 28.20 110.90 29.10 19.30 48.40 5.40 164.70 
(1974-79) (50.21) (17.12) (67.33) (17.67) (11.72) (29.39) (3.28) (100.00) 
Sixth Plan 237.30 21.40 258.70 73.80 69.00 142.80 15.10 416.50 
(1980-85) (56.97) (5.14) (62.11) (17.72) (16.57) (34.29) (3.63) (100.00) 
Seventh Plan 494.60 62.70 557.40 155.20 165.10 320.30 35.20 913.10 
(1985-90) (54.17) (6.87) (61.04) (17.00) (18.08) (35.08) (3.85) (100.00) 
Annual Plan  172.00 34.50 206.40 57.20 55.40 112.50 10.20 329.40 
1991-92 (52.22) (10.47) (62.66) (17.36) (16.82) (34.15) (3.10) (100.00) 
Eighth Plan 1318.50 147.20 1465.70 483.40 364.70 848.40 58.40 2373.10 
(1992-97) (55.56) (6.20) (61.76) (20.37) (15.37) (35.75) (2.46) (100.00) 
1997-98 404.11 16.80 420.91 120.08 67.56 187.64 37.80 646.35 
  (62.52) (2.60) (65.12) (18.58) (10.45) (29.03) (5.85) (100.00) 
1998-99 394.20 14.20 408.40 132.70 71.10 203.80 20.60 632.80 
  (62.29) (2.24) (64.54) (20.97) (11.24) (32.21) (3.26) (100.00) 
1999-00 441.21 19.88 461.09 163.16 82.03 245.19 41.14 747.42 
  (59.03) (2.66) (61.69) (21.83) (10.98) (32.80) (5.50) (100.00) 
2000-01 RE 518.27 121.69 639.96 157.59 136.76 294.35 56.99 991.30 
 (52.28) (12.28) (64.56) (15.90) (13.80) (29.69) (5.75) (100.00) 
2001-02 BE 603.5 95.34 698.84 190.67 152.52 343.19 47.04 1089.07 
 (55.41) (8.75) (64.17) (17.51) (14.00) (31.51) (4.32) (100.00) 
 
 
Notes: RE: Revised Estimates, BE: Budget Estimates 
Source: Rao and Singh (2005) 
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Table 7: Criteria and Relative Weights for Tax Sharing 
 
Criterion 
Weight (%) 
11th FC 
Weight (%) 
12th FC 
1.  Population (1971 Census) 10 25 
2.  Income (Distance Method)* 62.5 50 
3.  Area 7.5 10 
4.  Index of Infrastructure 7.5 0 
5.  Tax Effort** 5.0 7.5 
6.  Fiscal Discipline*** 7.5 7.5 
 
Notes: *The distance method is given by: (Yh-Yi)Pi/Σ(Yh-Yi)Pi   where, where Yi and Yh represent per capita 
SDP of the ith and the average of the three highest income states respectively and Pi is the population of the 
ith state, using 1971 figures. For the three highest income states, a notional distance is assigned. 
** Tax Effort η is estimated as η = (Ti / Yi) / √(1/Yi) where, Ti is the per capita tax revenue collected by the 
ith state and Yi is the per capita State domestic product of the ith  state. 
*** Estimated as the improvement in the ratio of own revenue of a state to its revenue expenditures divided 
by a similar ratio for all States averaged for the period 1966-99 over 1991-1993 (11th FC years used for 
illustration). 
Source: Rao and Singh (2005), Twelfth Finance Commission Report (Twelfth Finance Commission, 2004) 
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Table 8: Planning Commission Formula for Distributing State Plan Assistance 
 
 
Criteria 
 
Share in 
central plan 
assistance   
(per cent) 
 
Share of 
grants and 
loans 
 
Distribution 
criteria 
non-special 
category 
states 
 
A.   Special category States  
 
30 
 
90:10 
 
 
 
B.   Non-special category States  
 
     (i)   Population (1971) 
     (ii)  Per capita income, of which 
           (a)  According to the ‘deviation’ 
                method covering only the 
                States with per capita 
                income below the national  
                average 
 
           (b)  According to the `distance' 
                method covering all the  
                non-special category states 
                 
     (iii) Fiscal performance, 
           of which 
           (a)  Tax effort  
           (b)  Fiscal management 
           (c)  National objectives 
 
      (iv) Special problems 
 
Total             
 
70 
 
30:70 
 
 
 
 
60.0 
25.0 
 
20.0 
 
 
 
 
 
5.0 
 
 
7.5 
 
2.5 
2.5 
2.5 
 
7.5 
 
100.0 
 
Notes: 1. The formula is as revised in December, 1991; 2. Fiscal management is assessed as the 
difference between States' own total plan resources estimated at the time of finalizing annual plan and their 
actual performance, considering latest five years; 3. Under the criterion of the performance in respect of 
certain programs of national priorities the approved formula covers four objectives, viz.  (i) population 
control, (ii) elimination of illiteracy, (iii) on-time completion of externally aided projects, and (iv) success 
in land reforms. 
 
Source: Rao and Singh (2005) 
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Table 9: State-Local Revenues, Percentage Composition 
 
Revenue Source 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03
Rural Governments 
Own Tax 3.64 3.04 3.24 3.61 3.87 
Own Non-Tax 3.07 2.95 2.86 2.77 2.98 
Own Revenue 6.71 5.99 6.10 6.38 6.84 
Assignment + Devolution 30.20 29.23 28.10 27.46 27.69 
Grants-in-Aid 56.34 58.92 57.76 58.85 58.95 
Others 6.75 5.85 8.04 7.32 6.52 
Total Other Revenue 93.29 94.01 93.90 93.62 93.16 
Total Revenue 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Urban Governments 
Own Tax 41.30 39.10 38.53 38.85 39.23 
Own Non-Tax 18.39 16.92 18.13 18.97 19.20 
Own Revenue 59.69 56.02 56.65 57.83 58.43 
Assignment + Devolution 19.18 20.09 20.45 18.12 17.69 
Grants-in-Aid 15.70 17.09 15.36 17.64 16.48 
Others 5.43 6.80 7.54 6.42 7.39 
Total Other Revenue 40.31 43.98 43.35 42.17 41.57 
Total Revenue 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
 
Source: Constructed from Finance Commission (2004), Annexures 8.8 and 8.9) 
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Table 10: Finance Commission Formula for Local Devolution 
 
Criterion 
Weight (%) 
11th FC 
Weight (%) 
12th FC 
1.  Population  40 40 
2. Distance from Highest Per Capita Income  20 20 
3.  Geographical Area 10 10 
4.  Index of Decentralization 20 - 
5.  Revenue Effort 
(a) with respect to state’s own revenue 
(b) with respect to GSDP 
10 20 
10 
10 
6.  Index of Deprivation - 10 
 
Source: Finance Commission (2004, Chapter 8)
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Table 11: Central and State Fiscal Deficits (Percent of GDP) 
 
Year Center States Consolidated 
   Total Revenue Primary 
1990-91 6.6 3.3 9.4 4.2 5.0 
1991-92 4.7 2.9 7.0 3.4 2.3 
1992-93 4.8 2.8 7.0 3.2 2.1 
1993-94 6.4 2.4 8.3 4.3 3.3 
1994-95 4.7 2.7 7.1 3.7 1.9 
1995-96 4.2 2.6 6.5 3.2 1.6 
1996-97 4.1 2.7 6.4 3.6 1.3 
1997-98 4.8 2.9 7.3 4.1 2.1 
1998-99 5.1 4.2 9.0 6.4 3.7 
1999-00 5.4 4.6 9.6 6.3 3.9 
2000-01 5.7 4.3 9.8 6.6 4.0 
2001-02 6.1 4.2 9.9 6.9 3.7 
2002-03 5.9 4.7 9.6 6.7 3.1 
2003-04 4.5 4.4 8.5 5.8 2.1 
2004-05 (RE)*  4.0 4.0 8.4 4.1 2.3 
2005-06 (BE)** 4.1 3.1 7.7 3.4 1.8 
2006-07 (BE) 3.8 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
 
Sources: RBI Annual Reports (RBI, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005), RBI Bulletin (RBI, 2006a). 
Notes: RE: revenue estimate; BE: budget estimate; * Center’s figure is actual; ** Center’s figure is RE. 
The consolidated deficit indicators net out the inter-governmental transactions between the Center and 
States, and do not equal to the sum of the deficits of the Center and the States. 1990s figures for the Center 
exclude small savings allocated to the States, to give consistency across the accounting change related to 
the treatment of national small savings. The 2005-06 figures are given as reported, but appear to have an 
inconsistency, since the consolidated figure exceeds the center and state sum. n.a. – not available 
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Table 12: General Government Debt (percent of GDP) 
 
Year Debt 
1990-91 64.4 
1995-96 61.2 
2000-01 70.4 
2001-02 75.8 
2002-03 80.0 
2003-04 81.1 
2004-05 (RE) 82.0 
2005-06 (BE) 81.3 
 
Source: RBI (2005) 
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Table 13: Trends in Revenue and Expenditure Components, All States (% of GDP) 
 
Period Own Tax 
Revenues 
Own 
Non-Tax 
Revenues 
Finance 
Commission 
Transfers 
Non-Finance 
Commission 
Transfers 
Revenue 
Expenditures 
Interest 
Payments 
Pensions 
1993-96 5.27  1.55  2.94 1.62 12.00  1.86 0.63 
2000-03 5.44 1.26 2.88 1.23 13.34  2.65 1.25 
Change 0.17  -0.29 -0.05 -0.39 1.34  0.79  0.62 
 
Source: Twelfth Finance Commission Report (Finance Commission, 2004) 
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Table 14: Comparative Fiscal Performance, Major States (% of GSDP) 
 
 Revenue 
Deficit,  
2000-03 
(Rank) 
Change in 
Revenue 
Deficit, 1993-
96 to 2000-03 
(Rank) 
Fiscal 
Deficit, 
2000-03 
(Rank) 
Change in 
Fiscal 
Deficit, 1993-
96 to 2000-03 
(Rank) 
Debt,  
2000-03 
(Rank) 
Fiscal 
Deficit, 
2004-05 
(Rank) 
Andhra Pradesh  -2.03 (13) -1.51 (11) -4.57 (9) -1.41 (13) 29.93 (11) -3.4 (12) 
Bihar  -1.87 (14) -0.04 (15) -4.52 (10) -1.67 (10) 44.35 (5) -5.6* (4) 
Goa  -2.44 (10) -3.89 (3) -4.68 (6) -2.38 (4) 33.54 (9) -3.9 (11) 
Gujarat  -4.66 (3) -4.75 (1) -5.74 (5) -3.93 (2) 37.92 (7) -6.3 (2) 
Haryana  -1.32 (15) -0.56 (14) -3.69 (15) -1.19 (14) 28.02 (12) -1.3 (15) 
Karnataka  -2.21 (11) -2.15 (9) -4.37 (11) -1.65 (11) 27.27 (13) -2.7 (14) 
Kerala  -4.17 (5) -2.99 (5) -5.13 (6) -1.81 (6) 37.58 (8) -5.3 (8) 
Madhya Pradesh  -2.05 (12) -1.44 (12) -3.94 (13) -1.78 (7) 30.42 (10) -6.3* (2) 
Maharashtra  -3.09 (7) -3.00 (4) -4.12 (12) -1.96 (5) 27.11 (14) -5.2 (9) 
Orissa  -4.91 (2) -2.91 (6) -7.84 (1) -3.21 (3) 63.68 (1) -5.6 (4) 
Punjab  -4.53 (4) -2.66 (8) -6.14 (3) -1.77 (8) 46.66 (3) -5.2 (9) 
Rajasthan  -3.87 (6) -2.78 (7) -6.05 (4) -1.54 (12) 44.88 (4) -6.5 (1) 
Tamil Nadu  -2.50 (9) -1.78 (10) -3.75 (14) -1.77 (8) 26.16 (15) -2.9 (13) 
Uttar Pradesh  -2.98 (8) -1.21 (13) -5.07 (7) -1.03 (15) 46.94 (2) -5.6* (4) 
West Bengal  -5.47 (1) -3.95 (2) -7.31 (2) -4.13 (1) 42.73 (6) -5.4 (7) 
Source: Twelfth Finance Commission Report (Finance Commission, 2004) and RBI (2006b) 
* These states’ figures exclude those for the split-off states of Jharkhand (-8.1%), Chhattisgarh (-5.6%) and 
Uttaranchal (-13.8%) 
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Table 15: Comparative Revenues and Expenditures, Major States (% of GSDP) 
 
 Own Tax 
Revenue,  
2000-03 (Rank) 
Change in Own 
Tax Revenue, 
1993-96 to 2000-
03 (Rank) 
Revenue 
Expenditure, 
2000-03 (Rank) 
Change in 
Revenue 
Expenditure, 
1993-96 to 
2000-03 (Rank) 
Andhra Pradesh  7.30 (9) 1.40 (12) 15.56 (10) 2.08 (9) 
Bihar  4.46 (2) 0.75 (7) 18.11 (3) 1.60 (11) 
Goa  6.46 (6) -1.45 (1) 17.25 (5) 0.13 (15) 
Gujarat  7.71 (10) 0.20 (5) 18.37 (2) 5.85 (1) 
Haryana  8.30 (13) 1.09 (9) 13.45 (15) 0.39 (14) 
Karnataka  8.33 (14) -0.19 (4) 15.33 (11) 1.36 (12) 
Kerala  8.11 (12) -0.34 (3) 16.11 (8) 1.18 (13) 
Madhya Pradesh  6.45 (5) 1.53 (13) 16.74 (7) 3.45 (3) 
Maharashtra  7.76 (11) 1.12 (10) 14.10 (14) 3.42 (4) 
Orissa  5.81 (3) 1.87 (14) 22.22 (1) 5.74 (2) 
Punjab  7.13 (8) 1.87 (14) 15.33 (11) 2.59 (7) 
Rajasthan  6.48 (7) 0.25 (6) 18.06 (4) 2.63 (6) 
Tamil Nadu  9.00 (15) 0.98 (8) 15.60 (9) 1.66 (10) 
Uttar Pradesh  5.88 (4) 1.12 (10) 16.78 (6) 2.50 (8) 
3.23 (5) West Bengal  4.26 (1) -1.20 (2) 15.02 (13) 
 
Source: Twelfth Finance Commission Report (Finance Commission, 2004) 
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Table 16: Summary of Fiscal Situation of Local Governments (Rs. 10 million) 
 
  
 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 
Rural Governments 
Total Revenue 17295.68 22264.13 23244.36 22470.07 24010.52 
Expenditure      
Revenue Expenditure 13031.47 15889.15 18131.61 18177.17 17739.97 
Capital Expenditure 5275.41 5803.97 5928.53 5764.02 6546.32 
24286.29 Total Expenditure 18306.89 21693.12 24060.14 23941.19 
Urban Governments 
12596.50 Total Revenue 11514.64 13172.96 14581.04 15149.20 
Expenditure      
10671.63 Revenue Expenditure 9059.47 10690.30 11665.88 12204.78 
3325.40 Capital Expenditure 2975.47 3761.36 4077.17 3709.51 
13997.02 Total Expenditure 12034.95 14451.67 15743.05 15914.29 
 
Source: Twelfth Finance Commission Report (Finance Commission, 2004) 
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Table 17: State Level Human Development Indices 
State 1981 1981 1991 1991 2001 2001 
  Value Rank Value Rank Value Rank 
Andhra Pradesh 0.298 9 0.377 9 0.416 10 
Bihar 0.237 14 0.308 14 0.367 14 
Gujarat 0.360 4 0.431 6 0.479 6 
Haryana 0.360 5 0.443 5 0.509 5 
Karnataka 0.346 6 0.412 7 0.478 7 
Kerala 0.500 1 0.591 1 0.638 1 
Madhya Pradesh 0.245 13 0.328 12 0.394 12 
Maharashtra 0.363 3 0.452 4 0.523 4 
Orissa 0.267 10 0.345 11 0.404 11 
Punjab 0.411 2 0.475 2 0.537 2 
Rajasthan 0.256 11 0.347 10 0.424 9 
Tamil Nadu 0.343 7 0.466 3 0.531 3 
Uttar Pradesh 0.255 12 0.314 13 0.388 13 
West Bengal 0.305 8 0.404 8 0.472 8 
All India 0.302  0.381  0.472  
       
Unweighted average 0.325  0.407  0.469  
Standard deviation 0.071  0.075  0.072  
Coefficient of variation 0.219  0.185  0.155  
 
Sources: Planning Commission (2002) and Singh and Srinivasan (2005). 
 
 94
